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"THE LIBERAL TREATMENT OF




Canada's tortured relationship with its First Nations can be studied on many
levels in virtually every area of human interaction. In the past twenty years, an
impressive body of literature has set out to do just that, producing hundreds of
scholarly works that recast Canada's relationship to Native people in a new way.
Native people themselves, quite independently of scholars, have also recast the
relationship of their own nations with Canada. This resurgence of Native politics
has led to armed stand-offs, the creation of Nunavut, an Inuit territory within
Canada, the demise of the Meech Lake Accord and local assertions of Native
rights on a wide variety of fronts.'
This political and cultural resurgence also has a legal dimension, as the First
Nations have used the courts to redefine their relationship with the Canadian
nation-state. Canadian courts have been notoriously unreceptive to Native legal
The research and editorial assistance of Kathryn Swedlow, a third year student at CUNY Law
School and a technical editor, is gratefully acknowledged. Research visits to the National
Archives of Canada and the Ontario Provincial Archives were supported by grants from the
Canadian Studies Grant Program and a City University of New York/Professional Staff
Congress Faculty Research Grant.
There are a number of studies of Native political action in Canada. See M. Asch, Home and
Native Land: Aboriginal Rights and the Canadian Constitution (Toronto: Methuen, 1984). The
armed stand-off at Oka in the summer of 1990 brought Canadian native issues to the attention
of the world through elaborate media coverage and is the subject of several books. See e.g., R.
Homung, One Nation Under the Gun (Toronto: Stoddart, 1991); G. York & L. Pindera, People
of the Pines: The Warriors and the Legacy of Oka (Toronto: Little, Brown, 1991); and A.A.
Borovoy, Uncivil Obedience: The Tactics and Tales of a Democratic Agitator (Toronto: Lester
Publishing, 1991). Native American political activity is the subject of S.E. Cornell, The Return
of the Native: American Indian Political Resurgence (New York: Oxford University Press,
1988), although his primary focus is on the United States.
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claims. This is especially evident in a highly unsatisfactory series of judgments
in "Indian title" cases, and in many other areas of the law as well. Two landmark
cases illustrate the failure of Canadian courts to come to terms with Native
rights. In Delgamuukw v. The Queen, Chief Justice McEachem of the Supreme
Court of British Columbia wrote that "the difficulties facing the Indian
populations of the territory.. .will not be solved in the context of legal rights." 2
McEachern further characterized such legal concepts as "ownership,"
"sovereignty," and "rights," all of which are foundational to Anglo-Canadian
jurisprudence, as "fascinating legal concepts" which would not solve the
underlying social and economic problems of Native people.3
Mr. Justice Steele of the Ontario Supreme Court, in Attorney-General for
Ontario v. Bear Island Foundation, disposed of the land rights of the Temagami
Indians in an even more underhanded way, without even finding the Indian
nations' rights "fascinating legal concepts."4 In a lengthy decision that has been
characterized as "antideluvian," Steele took a Victorian and imperialist view of
Native rights, aggressively denying every element of the Temagami land claim.5
These cases, through the sheer magnitude of the legal effort involved, reached
the limits of the Canadian legal process as a dispute settlement mechanism. They
exhausted both the Indian nations capacities to sustain litigation, and that of the
courts to adjudicate disputes. Delgamuukw is one of the most extensive ever
tried anywhere in the world. The case required 318 days to introduce the
evidence and 56 days to argue. The record includes 23,503 pages of evidence at
trial, 5,898 pages of argument and 9,200 exhibits, totalling over 50,000 transcript
pages; the plaintiff's draft outline of argument at 3,250 pages and the Province's
1,975 pages. 6 While Bear Island pales by comparison, that trial still took 119
days over two years. The testimony filled 68 volumes, backed by 3,000 exhibits,
2 Delgamuukw v. The Queen in Right of the Province of British Columbia and the Attorney
General of Canada, No. 0843 Smithers Registry (1990) at 299. My citations are to the official
Smithers Registry report of the case which, because of the considerable interest, was bound and
sold by the Court.
3 Ibid. At the risk of seeming impertinent, it is impossible to imagine such dicta being included
in a corporate case, arguing that such concepts as "ownership" and "rights" would not solve the
problems of a bankrupt corporation. Nor are they "fascinating legal concepts" in any dismissive
sense: they are core concepts in Canadian constitutional law.
4 Attorney-General for Ontario v. Bear Island Foundation et al., Potts et al. v. Attorney-General
for Ontario (1984), 49 O.R. (2d) 353. This decision was upheld on appeal in Re Bear Island
Foundation et al. and the Queen in Right of Ontario et al. (1989), 70 O.R. (2d) 574.
5 K. McNeil, "The Temagami Indian Land Claim: Loosening the Judicial Straight Jacket" and T.
Hall, "Where Justice Lies, Aboriginal Rights and Wrongs in Temagami" both in M. Bray & A.
Thomson, eds., Temagami: A Wilderness Debate (Toronto: Dundum Press, 1990). A history of
the Temagami Indians and their land is found in B.W. Hodgins & J. Benidickson, The
Temagami Experience: Recreation, Resources and Aboriginal Rights in the Northern Ontario
Wilderness (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1989) at 268-69.
6 Delgamuukw, supra note 2 at 1.
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filling an entire courtroom. 7 The underlying message to First Nations is that
there is nothing they can do to meet the legal standard of proof required to win
their land rights cases. Yet, Bear Island makes clear that it is not the volume of
evidence that is the barrier to recognition of Native land rights: it is Canadian
legal doctrine, based on Victorian imperialist theory, that essentially denies the
Indian nations any rights not directly accorded to them by the Crown.
This abdication by the courts of their role in defining the position of Natives in
Canada not only denies Canada's Native people their legal rights, but also serves
to further marginalize Natives from Canadian life and institutions. Judges and
courts serve critical social functions in resolving disputes and defining complex
social, economic and political relationships. By denying that such issues are
"legal" or justiciable, the courts closed down one important institutional area
where the resolution of difficult conflicts takes place. In the United States,
judges and courts have consistently served a critical role in mediating between
national political decisions on Native rights and the Indian nations' view of their
rights.8 This body of law is cited in virtually every Canadian Native rights case.
As in Canada, the American national political processes have been closed to
Native Americans because of their poverty, isolation and their distinct political
and cultural traditions. Majoritarian political institutions are beyond the access
of Native political institutions, expensive beyond the reach of Native resources
and more responsive to the votes of the non-Native majority. Accordingly, the
American courts, particularly the federal courts, have become a major arena for
the resolution of disputes between Natives and the larger society, making issues
of Native rights "legal rights" in every sense of the term.
There is no parallel in Canadian Indian law as there is no such elaborate body
of Canadian court cases making an effort to delineate the rights of Native people
against either the Canadian state or non-Native Canadian people. This study will
examine the origins of the failure of the Canadian legal system to develop such
doctrines. The focus will be on nineteenth century Ontario, the place where both
the Indian Act of 1876 and current Canadian Indian policy has its North
American roots.9 Beyond its historic role, Ontario courts provided Canada with
its foundational Native rights case, Regina v. St. Catharine's Milling and
Lumber Company.'O This case coursed through two Ontario courts and the
7 "Where Justice Lies", supra note 5 at 228.
8 C.F. Wilkinson, American Indians, Time and the Law: Native Societies in a Modern
Constitutional Democracy (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1987) is an analysis of the role
of the federal courts, particularly the United States Supreme Court, in creating an elaborate
body of federal Indian law.
9 The Indian Act, the legal embodiment of Canadian Indian policy, clearly stemmed from early
Ontario Indian Acts and policy. J. Leslie & R. Maguire, The Historical Development of the
Indian Act, 2d ed. (Ottawa: Department of Indian and Northern Affairs Canada, 1978) at 1. See
also D.L. Hawley, The Annotated 1990 Indian Act (Toronto: Carswell, 1990).
to (1885), 10 0. R. 196.
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Supreme Court of Canada. Both the Supreme Court and the Privy Council
adopted much of the reasoning of the Ontario courts." Although the case dealt
narrowly with the question of Indian title to traditional lands, the decision was
rendered in the context of a broad denial of Indian rights generally. Ironically, in
a case where Native rights were lost, no Indian was a party to the case.' 2
This failure by the Canadian courts to recognize Native rights is doubly ironic.
It is fundamental to Canadian legal history that the Canadian frontier was a
legally structured frontier, using the law to govern Indian and white relations as
a means of avoiding the "collision" of the two cultures. This model is often
juxtaposed against the violence of the American frontier. 3 However, the
Canadian result is very much the same: Native people are impoverished and
deprived of their lands in both countries.
The unique nature of Native rights law universally requires historical analysis
and argument. Canadian legal history, like American and Commonwealth legal
history, is changing. The traditional legal history of judges, courts and cases has
given way to a "new" legal history which focuses on the social impact of the law
on the various peoples and processes that make up Canada. 4 Particularly
important have been a number of legal histories concerning women and family
life, and the application of the criminal law to the lives of ordinary people.5 In
contrast to a large volume of literature on the history of Canadian Indian policy,
The context of the case is discussed in S.B. Cottam, "Indian Title as a 'Celestial Institution':
David Mills and the St. Catharine's Milling Case"; and A.J. Hall, "The St. Catharine's Milling
and Lumber Company versus the Queen: Indian Land Rights as a Factor in Federal-Provincial
Relations in Nineteenth-Century Canada" both in K. Abel & J. Friesen, eds., Aboriginal
Resource Use in Canada: Historical and Legal Aspects (Winnipeg: University of Manitoba
Press, 1991). See also B. Cottam, An Historical Background of the St. Catharine's Milling and
Lumber Company Case (M.A. Thesis, University of Western Ontario, 1987); and D.B. Smith,
"Aboriginal Rights a Century Ago" (1987) 67:1 The Beaver 4.
12 The parties were the Province of Ontario and St. Catharine's Milling and Lumber Corporation,
a private company with close ties to the Conservative government of Canada, which was
indirectly a party, defending the national government's claim to Indian lands in Ontario
through the company. The case is discussed in detail in section II.
13 G. Parker, "Canadian Legal Culture" in L.A. Knafla, ed., Law and Justice in a New Land:
Essays in Western Canadian Legal History (Toronto: Carswell, 1986) at 3. The model was
explicitly at the roots of nineteenth century Ontario Indian law and is central to Chancellor
Alexander Boyd's opinion in St. Catharine's Milling. Supra note 10 at 203-16.
14 D.H. Flaherty, ed., Essays in the History of Canadian Law, vols. I & 2 (Toronto: University of
Toronto Press for the Osgoode Society, 1981 and 1983) provides a good introduction to current
scholarship in Canadian legal history. See also Knafla, ibid.; P. Waite, S. Oxner & T. Barnes,
Law in a Colonial Society: The Nova Scotia Experience (Toronto: Carswell, 1984); and
Canadian Law and History Conference, Papers (Carleton University, Ottawa, 8 June 1987)
[unpublished]. Recent analytical works on the state of Canadian legal historiography are M.H.
Ogilvie, "Recent Developments in Canadian Law: Legal History" (1987) 19 Ottawa L. Rev.
225; and B. Wright, "Towards a New Canadian Legal History" (1984) 22 Osgoode Hall L.J.
349.
15 For a review of this literature, see "Recent Developments in Canadian Law: Legal History",
ibid. at 251-53.
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the legal history of Native people remains underdeveloped. 16
This article will analyze the nineteenth century context of Ontario Indian law.
First, it will look at the fifty reported cases which judicially defined native rights
in nineteenth century Ontario, together with a few early twentieth century cases
that cast light on those earlier cases. Second, it will focus specifically on the
legal doctrine of St. Catharine's Milling. This was not an isolated case, but was
decided in the context of cases fundamentally hostile to Native rights. Third, it
will analyze how the application of Canadian criminal law to Native people
directly interfered with Native life. Fourth, an effort will be made to understand
how Native people saw Canadian law, and how they attempted to deal with the
law's intrusion into their world. This attempt at an ethno-legal history of Native
people is necessarily speculative, but raises important issues in Canadian legal
history. Finally, the meaning of Indian law in the context of nineteenth century
Ontario legal culture will be considered.
Beyond contributing to the modem understanding of the context of Canadian
Indian law, this article also seeks to contribute to the understanding of Canadian
legal history. To the extent that the law structures Native/white relations in
Canada, a primary focus has been on how the law acts against Native people.
There has been no attempt to understand how Native people acted to structure
the impact of Canadian law on their lives.
I. NATIVES UNDER NINETEENTH CENTURY
ONTARIO LAW
While no Native people were parties to St. Catharine's Milling, the evidence
is clear that Natives were not strangers to Ontario courts. A search of the indices
to Ontario's seven major reporting systems reveals fifty reported nineteenth
century cases concerning Indian rights in some form.17 These reporting systems
were commercial enterprises, published for sale to the legal profession. The
16 Knafla, ed., supra note 13, contains three essays on Canadian Indian policy. None of the other
works cited contain any reference to the legal history of Native people. Literature on Canadian
Indian policy includes dozens of lengthy studies published by the Treaties and Historical
Research Centre of the Department of Indian and Northern Affairs. In addition to this work,
there are dozens of published studies. See E.B. Titley, A Narrow Vision: Duncan Campbell
Scott and the Administration of Indian Affairs in Canada (Vancouver: University of British
Columbia Press, 1986). Moving legal histories of Native people and their relationship to
Canadian society are clearly contained in both Bear Island, supra note 4 and Delgamuukw,
supra note 2. Published studies include S.L. Harring, "The Rich Men of the Country: Canadian
Law in the Land of the Copper Inuit, 1914-1930" (1989) 21 Ottawa L. Rev. 1.
17 The reporters searched were the Upper Canada Reporters (U.C.R.), Upper Canada Common
Pleas Reports (U.C.C.P), Ontario Weekly Reporter (O.W.R.), Ontario Practice Reports
(O.P.R.), Ontario Appeal Reports (O.A.R.), Ontario Reports (O.R.) and Grants Upper Canada
Chancery Reports (Gr.). B. Slattery, Canadian Native Law Cases (C.N.L.C.) (Saskatoon:
University of Saskatchewan Native Law Centre, 1980) vols. i through iii reprint most of these
1992
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selection of cases for inclusion was not random, but based on the commercial
importance of the case to the profession. There is question whether important
Indian rights cases were omitted from the reporters because two of the most
important nineteenth century Ontario Indian cases were not reported. Attorney
General of Ontario v. Francis et al. was the first major case calling for an
application of the St. Catharine's Milling decision. It remained unreported for
nearly one hundred years, then was published in Canadian Native Law Cases
from notes found in the files of a lawyer. 18 Caldwell v. Fraser further applied St.
Catharine's Milling in a "learned and elaborate" judgment that has been quoted
and discussed in a legal treatise, but has never been reported. 19 There is no
simple way of determining how many equally important cases went unreported:
such cases lie in obscure records, among the hundreds of benchbooks in the
provincial archives.20
These fifty-two cases (including Francis and Caldwell) represent the best
existing record of the legal status of Native people in Ontario. Analysis of these
cases reveals a great deal about the role of the law in structuring the place of
Native people in English-speaking Canada. This is true because of the historical
importance of Ontario as the political center of English speaking Canada even if
we acknowledge that largely independent legal histories exist for British
Columbia and the Maritime Provinces.21
cases, but not all of them. This number represents the total number of reported opinions
delivered by Ontario courts; thus, several cases are counted twice, having produced reported
opinions by both a trial and appellate court.
1 (1889), 2 C.N.L.C. 6. The case was found in the Aemilius Irving Papers, Box 42, file 42, item 9
in the Ontario Provincial Archives [unpublished]. Irving, a prominent Ontario lawyer,
represented the Province in the case.
19 Delivered January 31, 1898 by Judge Rose, of the Ontario Court of Queen's Bench, discussed
in W.D. McPherson & J.M. Clark, The Law of Mines in Canada (Toronto: Carswell, 1898) at
15-16.
20 The Ontario Provincial Archives is still collecting original court records from nineteenth
century Ontario. These records have been inaccessible to modem scholars, often for a century
or more.
21 British Columbia, a colony with little relationship to Canada before confederation, has a unique
Native history that is well documented, including legal history. British Columbia Queen's
Printer, Papers Connected with the Indian Land Question, 1850-1875 (Victoria: Queen's
Printer, 1987) (originally 1875); P. Tennant, Aboriginal Peoples and Politics: The Indian Land
Question in British Columbia, 1849-1989 (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press,
1990); R. Fisher, Contact and Conflict: Indian-European Relations in British Columbia, 1774-
1890 (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 1977); D. Cole & I. Chaikin, An Iron
Hand Upon the People: The Law Against the Potlatch on the Northwest Coast (Seattle:
University of Washington Press, 1990); D. Williams, The Man for a New Country: Sir Matthew
Baillie Begbie (Sydney, B.C.: Gray's, 1977). For the Maritimes, see L.F.S. Upton, Micmacs
and Colonists: Indian-White Relations in the Maritimes, 1713-1867 (Vancouver: University of
British Columbia Press, 1979); and J. Fingard, "The New England Company and the New
Brunswick Indians, 1786-1826: A Comment on the Colonial Perversion of British
Benevolence" (1972) 42:1 Acadiensis 29. Native people in Quebec and French Canada have a
legal history that is distinct and is not considered further here. C.J. Jaenen, "French Sovereignty
and Native Nationhood During the French Regime" (1986) 113:2 Native Studies Review 83.
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The largest number of the reported cases concerned Indian land title acquired
by whites.22 It is clear whose interests were at stake. In most of these cases, no
Indians were parties, their title having been alienated to competing white
interests. For nineteenth century Ontario's 28,000 Indians, Canadian law was
either the legal foundation of white claims to Indian lands or the basis for
locking them in a jail cell for violation of some petty crime under Canadian law,
most often an offence unknown to Native tradition.2 3 The avaricious designs of
colonial whites on Indian lands, as articulated in the Royal Proclamation of
1763, formed the basis of the original colonial Indian policy.24 Among other
provisions, the Proclamation forbade the alienation of Indian lands except by the
Crown. It is clear that the major reason for this policy was that the unscrupulous
land-grabbing practices of colonial whites provoked Indian wars and
destabilized the frontier, alienating the Indian nations at a time when the British
needed them as allies.25 There were also underlying humanistic concerns: many
white practices were immoral and unfair to the Indian nations, causing
drunkenness, disease and impoverishment. The Proclamation remained a legal
foundation of British and later Canadian Indian policy.2
6
While the precise legal issue varied from case to case, the Royal Proclamation
established a process for the alienation of those lands that denied frontier whites
direct access to ownership of Indian lands. Only the Crown could acquire Indian
lands, and then only through the treaty process of negotiation and purchase. The
22 About half of the reported cases concern some kind of land issue. Most unreported cases were
criminal cases.
23 The 1844 "Report on the Affairs of the Indians in Canada" gave the whole Indian population of
Ontario and Quebec at 43,000, with 28,000 living in Ontario (App. EEE and App. T, Journals
of the Legislative Assembly of Canada, 1844-45). Completely inconsistent is a report of 13,107
Indians in Ontario at Confederation (1867). The same report lists a 1924 Indian population of
26,706. Indians of Ontario: An Historical Review (Ottawa: Department of Citizenship and
Immigration, Indian Affairs Branch, 1966) at 42.
24 K.M. Narvey, "The Royal Proclamation of 7 October 1763, the Common Law and Native
Rights to Land Within the Territory Granted to the Hudson's Bay Company" (1973-74) 38:1
Sask. L. Rev. 123; R.N. Clinton, "The Proclamation of 1763: Colonial Prelude to Two
Centuries of Federal-State Conflict Over the Management of Indian Affairs" (1989) 69 Boston
U. L. Rev. 329; B. Slattery, The Land Rights of Indigenous Canadian Peoples, As Affected by
the Crown's Acquisition of Their Territories (Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Oxford, 1979);
J. Stagg, Anglo-Indian Relations in North America to 1763 and an Analysis of the Royal
Proclamation of 7 October 1763 (Ottawa: Department of Indian Affairs and Northern
Development, 1981). The full text of the Proclamation is reprinted in A.L. Getty and A.S.
Lussier, op cit, note I at 29-37.
25 J.R. Miller, Skyscrapers Hide the Heavens: A History of Indian-White Relations in Canada.
(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1989) c. 3.
26 D.W. Elliot, "Aboriginal Title" in B.W. Morse, ed., Aboriginal Peoples and the Law: Indian,
Mitis and Inuit Rights in Canada (Ottawa: Carleton University Press, 1985) 48 at 56. The
respective courts in St. Catharine's Milling spend a considerable amount of time analyzing the
legal force of the Royal Proclamation. See the discussion in section 2.
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Governor or Commander in Chief had the exclusive power to call a public
meeting for the restricted purpose of negotiating the sale of Indian lands.27 No
petty white official could pretend to negotiate an Indian land cession at an
ordinary tribal council. An elaborate series of "land surrenders" followed in
Southern Ontario in the early 1800s, spreading to the North shore of Lake
Superior in the Robinson Treaties of 1850.28 Once the land was acquired by the
Crown, it could be sold or given to individual whites. While some lands were
"reserved" for Natives, these lands were also subject to acquisition and sale by
the Crown, with the proceeds to be used for the benefit of the Indians. These
reserves apparently have a status short of actual ownership and are still the
subject of utilation.29 Thus, even Indian reserves became populated by whites.
In theory, these orderly procedures should have led to a relatively stable
process of white acquisition of Indian lands. Nearly twenty reported cases,
however, indicate that the process was flawed. If we assume that these cases are
representative of the range of problems that arose, the land alienation process
was fraught with confusion and corruption. Given the difficulty of access to the
courts and the large proportion of unreported cases, there must have been many
such cases. While these cases commonly raise issues of "Indian title," they did
not involve Native people, but rather settled competing white claims for land
that was formerly held by Indians-just as St. Catharine's Milling did.
At the outset, one legal principle was clear: Canadian law, rather than tribal
law, applied to Indian lands. The King v. Epaphrus Lord Phelps pitted the
Mohawk Nation against the Crown in an early dispute over which law governed
Mohawk lands.30 Joseph Brant, a Mohawk ally of Great Britain, received title to
a large tract of land along the Grand River as a reward for his services.31 He
27 These provisions are found at page 35 of the Proclamation as reprinted in Getty & Lussier, eds.,
infra note 36 at 29-37.
28 R.J. Surtees, "Indian Land Cessions in Upper Canada, 1815-1830" in Getty & Lussier, eds.,
infra note 36 at 65-84; The Hon. Alexander Morris, P.C., The Treaties of Canada with the
Indians of Manitoba and the Northwest Territories (Saskatoon: Fifth House Publishers, 1991)
(originally 1880) at 16-21. Surtees' work is based on his comprehensive history of the
alienation of Indian land in Ontario, "Indian Land Cessions in Ontario, 1763-1862: The
Evolution of a System" (Ph.D. Thesis, Carleton University, 1983).
29 R.J. Surtees, "The Development of an Indian Reserve Policy in Canada" (1969) 61 Ontario
History 87. An exhaustive legal analysis of the legal status of Indian reserve lands is R.H.
Bartlett, Indian Reserves and Aboriginal Lands in Canada: A Homeland: A Study in Law and
History (Saskatoon: University of Saskatchewan Native Law Centre, 1990).
30 (1823), 1 Tay. 47. The case is discussed in detail in W.R. Riddell, "The Sad Tale of an Indian
Wife" (1922) 13 Journal of the American Academy of Criminal Law and Criminology 82. This
issue was not settled by Phelps and went through the Ontario courts to the Supreme Court of
Canada in the 1970s in Isaac et al. v. Davey et al. (1973), 38 D.L.R. (3d) 23 (Ont. H.C.);
(1974), 51 D.L.R. (3d) 170 (Ont.C.A.); Davey et al. v. Isaac et al. (1977), 77 D.L.R. (3d) 481
(S.C.C.). To the Iroquois these issues are still unresolved. See infra note 273.
31 On the early history of Indian and white settlement of the Grand River Valley, see C.M.
Johnston, "An Outline of the Early Settlement of the Grand River Valley" (1962) 54 Ontario
History 43.
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leased a tract of one thousand acres to Phelps for 999 years. Phelps put the lands
in trust for the support of his Mohawk wife and children.
Later, guilty of treason against Great Britain in the War of 1812, Phelps fled to
the United States. Britain's treason statute provided for the forfeiture of property
and the Crown proceeded against Phelps' tract of land. The Mohawk tribe hired
a lawyer to defend the wife's lands. William Warren Baldwin, Treasurer of the
Law Society of Upper Canada, argued that the Mohawks were allies, not
subjects of the Crown, and that their lands were theirs to dispose of under tribal
law. The Solicitor General took the position that "the supposition that the
Indians are not subject to the laws of Canada is absurd," analogizing Indians
with French settlers. The Court upheld this view, and the Crown took the lands. 32
The first case in which Canada's Indians appeared in court through their own
hired lawyer to defend their lands and sovereignty, they lost completely, their
argument dismissed as "absurd." This set the tone for nineteenth century
litigation. Tragically, in most cases involving Indian rights, the Indian nations
were not even represented by counsel.
While Indians had full legal access to the courts, the reality was that justice
was so often denied that a report of the Aborigine's Protection Society, a major
London Native rights organization, confused the reality with the law. Concerned
about the "neglect of a means of securing justice to Indians in courts of law" the
group charged (in an 1839 report) that the Indians were "disabled by the colonial
laws to appear in courts of justice either singly or as tribes." The object of the
Society was clear: the full extension of law to Indians was necessary to
assimilate them into the mainstream of Canadian life. "It is not easy to conceive
how a barbarous people can accommodate themselves to the usages of a
civilize[d] country when they are studiously excluded from sharing its laws." A
lack of provision for Indian land rights was of special concern. 33 The colonial
government of Canada shared this view. The Bagot Commission, named after
Sir Charles Bagot, Governor General of Canada, completed an exhaustive,
reserve by reserve report on Indian affairs in Canada in 1844. The Commission
concluded that provincial governments had failed to protect the Indians from a
massive theft of their lands, producing great poverty on the reserves. 34 The
British colonial office took direct control over Indian affairs until it passed this
authority to the Dominion government at Confederation. 35 The policy based on
32 Ibid. at 88-89.
33 Aborigines' Protection Society, Report (London: Aborigines' Protection Society, 1839).
34 "Report on the Affairs of the Indians in Canada" (App. EEE and App. T, Journals of the
Legislative Assembly of Canada, 1844-45 and 1847) (unpaginated). The work of this
commission is discussed in J. Leslie, "The Bagot Commission: Developing a Corporate
Memory for the Indian Department" (1982) Canadian Historical Association, Papers 31.
35 D.T. McNab, "Herman Merivale and the Colonial Office Indian Policy in the Mid-Nineteenth
Century" (1981) 1 Canadian Journal of Native Studies 1; D. Leighton, "The Compact Tory as
Bureaucrat: Samuel Peters Jarvis and the Indian Department, 1837-1845" (1981) 73 Ontario
History 40; A.J. Hall, The Red Man's Burden: Land, Law and the Lord in the Indian Affairs of
Upper Canada, 1761-1858 (Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Toronto, 1984).
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"Indian Acts," and designed to protect and support the Ontario Indians until they
could be assimilated was paternalistic: a policy of "liberal treatment."36 It was in
this context that the first Ontario court cases were decided.
A. FRONTIER WHITE ATTEMPTS TO BARGAIN FOR INDIAN
LANDS
The clearest set of legal issues concerns white attempts to directly alienate
Indian land in circumvention of the Crown prerogative. The range of cases
suggests that whites were quite persistent and ingenious in their attempts to do
so. 37 Ontario courts were equally persistent in their defence of the Crown's
monopoly of control over Indian lands. These cases often pitted the courts
against the property interests of both frontier whites and Indians as it denied both
the right to dispose of the lands they held. It was a misdemeanor for anyone to
alienate Indian lands in any manner, including "purchase or lease,...or make any
contract with said Indians, for or concerning the sale of any lands." Furthermore,
it was a crime to trespass upon or occupy Indian lands.38 These acts were in
response to many attempts by frontier whites to occupy Indian lands, actions that
British officials knew had caused Indian wars in the United States. In an effort to
bring frontier white designs upon Indian lands under legal control, legislation
permitted the appointment of commissioners to investigate and try such cases.
The commissioners were expected to enforce Indian land laws, and to protect
Indian lands from intrusion by whites.39
36 Most of the historical research on Canadian Indian policy concerns these "Indian Acts";
therefore, this study focuses on the judicial, rather than legislative, embodiment of Indian
policy. It is important to note, however, that just as the judge-made law of Indian affairs in
Canada largely originated in Ontario, so did the "Indian Acts" of Ontario become the basis for
the Dominion Indian Acts. R.G. Moore, The Historical Development of the Indian Act (Ottawa:
Department of Indian and Northern Affairs Canada, 1979) part 1: "The Pre-Confederation
Period" at 1-50. See also J.S. Milloy, "The Early Indian Acts: Developmental Strategy and
Constitutional Change" in I.A.L. Getty & A.S. Lussier, eds., As Long As the Sun Shines and
Water Flows: A Reader in Canadian Native Studies (Vancouver: University of British
Columbia Press, 1983).
37 John Robinson, Chief Justice of Ontario, acknowledged the ineffectiveness of government
efforts to protect Indian lands in Bown v. West (1846), 1 U.C.E. & A. 117 at 118-19: "[T]he
government has always been desirous to deter and prevent white inhabitants from bargaining
with the Indians for the purchase of their lands, though their efforts to that end had been very
far from effectual."
38 13 and 14 Vic., c. 74, section 2.
39 The commissioners were appointed under sec. 1, of 2d Vic. c. 15 specifically to deal with
frontier conditions where whites had entered Indian lands, providing the commissioners with
extensive powers to travel to frontier localities, summarily try offenders under the Act, to
remove them from Indian lands, an authority backed by penal sanctions. This process of the
Commissioners' trials is discussed in The Queen v. Johnson (1850), 1 Gr. 409.
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In Little et al. v. Keating, an 1840 Walpole Island Reserve case, a squatter,
Shepherd Collock, was convicted by commissioners on the complaint of two
Indian chiefs of possessing "a portion of the Crown lands." 40 The evidence
showed that Collock had occupied this land since 1816 and that the whole of
Walpole Island had been set aside as a reserve for the Indians. After granting a
new trial on appeal, the Court held that the conviction was defective in that the
commissioners had no general jurisdiction over Crown lands, but needed to aver
that the lands in question were Indian lands.4' The opinion was equally technical
in other areas, denying that it could "tell judicially whether Walpole Island [was]
land occupied and claimed by Indians or not". The Court knew it had the
opportunity, at a new trial, to remedy the small defect in the original conviction
by simply finding the lands to be Indian lands. The Court of Queen's Bench
found the "complaint of the Indian Chiefs, naming no one and not saying
whether upon oath or not" was defective, held the commissioners to a higher
standard of evidence, and implied that only Indian testimony under oath was
admissible.42
At this time, Walpole Island Indian Reserve was heavily occupied by
American squatters. The impact of this decision was to leave Collock in illegal
possession of land on the reserve. This result can be read in several ways. It
cannot be denied that elementary legal principles might well lead the Court to
put the commissioners on notice that they owed a higher level of due process to
squatters. It is also clear that the Court's decision went out of its way to put
impediments in the path of the commissioner's ejectment of the squatters. This
decision impaired both Indian interests in protecting their diminishing reserved
lands, and an official government policy aimed at the stabilization of
Indian/white relations. Parallel cases in the following decades found courts more
flexible in dealing with frontier conditions and found commissioners providing a
higher level of due process.
Regina v. Baby is among the first Ontario cases in which an Indian appeared
in court as a witness, testifying for the Crown against Baby, a white man charged
with alienating Indian lands.43 The case, tried in 1854 at Sandwich, now
Windsor, concerned Indian lands on the Michigan border. These lands, like
Walpole Island, had been extensively occupied by aggressive American
squatters since the turn of the century. Alexander Clark, a fifty-four year old
Indian witness, testified that the immediate lands in question had been in Indian
40 (1840), 6 U.C.Q.B. (O.S.) 265. M'Chigeeng: Our Land: A History of the Walpole Island
Reserve (Walpole Island, 1985).
41 Ibid. at 266, 269-70.
42 Ibid. at 269. The Ontario court structure in the nineteenth century was complex. A complete
history can be found in M.A. Banks, "The Evolution of the Ontario Courts 1788-1981" in
Flaherty, ed., supra note 14, vol. 2 at 492.
43 (1854), 12 U.C.Q.B. 346. See supra note 38.
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hands for some time. The Indians held a council and decided to take possession
of this land and sell it in order to use the money to make improvements in their
village.- They asked their Indian Agent, Colonel Bruce, for permission to sell
the land but "could get no satisfaction." The tribe then went ahead and sold the
land to Mr. Baby for £250. The purchaser specifically agreed to take all risks of
the bargain and bear all expenses.45 The tribe, quite reasonably, had sold title to
land they had already lost the use of, getting money they needed for tribal
purposes.
Baby was convicted in a jury trial. Baby appealed. First, he denied that the
lands were Indian lands, implicitly challenging the Crown to prove the Indians
had title, but also arguing that Indian lands were only those lands physically
occupied by Indians at the time.46 The Court of Queen's Bench completely
avoided the title issues, focusing instead on the statute's prohibition of the act of
contract or bargaining with Indians over land-a phrase governing any lands
regardless of title. Second, relying on the chaotic state of lands on the frontier,
Baby made a number of technical arguments alleging a discrepancy between the
lands he was charged with bargaining for and those lands described by the
evidence at trial. 47 This argument directly challenged the capacity of the Crown
to sustain such convictions with Indian witnesses, who, while they were clearly
allowed to give evidence, were not likely to describe lands in the same terms as
described in court documents. Again, since the Court focused on the bargaining
process, the precise description of the lands involved was irrelevant. Finally,
Baby argued that he lacked the criminal intent to violate the law: he did not
intend to alienate Indian lands in violation of the statute. Rather, he intended to
seek Crown approval for his transaction, describing it as merely "conditional."
In a rare statement of Indian policy, the Ontario Court soundly rejected this
argument as running against the public policy designed to protect the Indians
from unscrupulous land speculators. 48 While the Court fully accepted the
testimony of Indian witnesses, it completely ignored the action of the tribal
council, accepting the Indians as absolute dependants of the Crown, at the mercy
of the Indian Agent. The council had no right to dispose of a small and useless
piece of land nor to assert any voice in the ultimate disposition of that land.
The result in Baby was consistent with the Court's broad defence of the
Crown's authority over Indian lands as set out in The Queen v. Strong. This case
was an action for trespass against a white squatter on the Grand River Reserve.49
44 Ibid. at 347.
45 Ibid. at 347-48.
46 Ibid. at 350-54.
47 Ibid. at 351-53.
48 Ibid. at 359-60.
49 (1850), 1 Gr. 392. On the designs of white squatters on the Grand River see "An Outline of the
Early Settlement of the Grand River Valley", supra note 3 1.
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Strong was among many squatters at Grand River whose ejectment was sought
by the tribe. Strong, like Baby, mounted a substantial defence, heavily based on
procedural issues and formalities of land title. Having lost before the two
commissioners, he appealed, arguing inter alia that there was insufficient
evidence to prove the lands in question were Indian lands. There was no
adequate system of land registration on the frontier. Strong was charged with
trespass on Indian lands because, like most white squatters, he made no effort to
purchase the land. Therefore, the Court could not evade holding the lands in
question were Indian lands within the meaning of the statute. The Court of
Chancery rejected Strong's argument, holding specifically that the parole
testimony of one Indian witness was sufficient to establish that the lands in
question were occupied by Indians, although ceded to the Province.50 While the
legal policy underlying this case is the same as Baby, the Indians in Strong had
requested the assistance of the Crown in removing trespassers from their lands.5S
Another Grand River case, The Queen v. James Hagar, while ultimately
leading to the same result, illustrated the changing nature of Indian land
occupancy. 52 Mary Martin, an Iroquois woman, lived alone on a cultivated lot on
the reserve. She was very poor, living on the proceeds of a few vegetables and a
government payment of £6 a year from Indian funds. Mary Martin thought it
would be more profitable to have her lot worked by whites rather than by Indians
and asked James Hagar, a white man, to work the land on shares. They made an
oral agreement that he would farm the land for five years, giving her one-third of
the proceeds. Upon hearing of the agreement, Iroquois chiefs persuaded the
woman to break it off. She agreed to do so and informed Hagar of her decision,
but he insisted that she honor the agreement and he planted wheat there.
Convicted of making a lease for Indian lands without the consent of the Crown,
Hagar appealed, arguing that the statute referred only to "legal leases," not
informal ones. The Court of Common Pleas, consistent with Baby, construed the
statute broadly, citing its language prohibiting such leases "in any manner or
form, or upon any terms whatsoever."53 The Ontario courts had moved beyond
narrow formalism in these cases, deciding them broadly in clear defence of the
government's Indian policy.
In fact, the Hagar Court directly addressed the policy behind these statutes in
response to Hagar's argument that his agreement was a benefit to Ms. Martin.
The Court stated that giving effect to such an agreement would amount to
legislating instead of administering the law. By characterizing the statute as
"designed to protect the Indians from all contracts made by them in respect to
lands set aside for their use, in consequence of their own improvidence," the
50 Ibid. at 405.
51 Ibid. at 393.
52 (1857), 7 U.C.C.P. 380.
53 Ibid. at 381-82.
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Court denied any interest in the substance of the bargain, limiting its inquiry
only to the question of whether the Crown had given consent5 4 As a matter of
law, Indians were improvident, even when, as in Baby, they made a good
bargain for land they did not want. Of course, the same Indians were not
improvident when they made agreements to sell these same lands to the Crown.
The few cases where individual Indians had acquired a legal title to their land
provided one exception to this rule. Totten v. Watson55 is apparently the first
case in which Ontario courts dealt directly with the nature of Indian title. The
issue here was distinct from other cases because 1200 acres had been patented in
1801 to Captain John Deserontyou, a Mohawk chief.5 6 He had left the land to
three sons. In 1842, one of his sons, William John, sold 100 acres of his
inheritance to Cuthbertson, a cousin. In 1856, he sold the same land to William
Totten, who had already begun to clear and farm it. Squatters continued to live
on this land, having been bought out earlier by Totten. Totten's title was
challenged under the same statute that forbade the sale of land by Indians
applied in Baby.57 Thus, in 1850s Ontario, individual Indians who held patented
land were not presumed "improvident" and protected by the same paternalistic
statute that governed unsettled or tribal lands.
The Court of Queen's Bench had no difficulty distinguishing patented lands
held by Indians from lands traditionally occupied by Indians. The distinction, of
course, was Crown title: Indians were "merely permitted" to occupy and enjoy
their traditional lands "at the pleasure of the Crown." However, the law had
never attempted to interfere with the disposition of lands granted to individual
Indians by the Crown. The Court noted that "very few such grants have been
made." 58 In acknowledging the full property rights in patented lands to
individual Indians, the court simply dismissed, without legal analysis, any Indian
property right in their traditional lands. This position was consistently held by
Ontario courts, and formed the basis for Ontario's argument in St. Catharine's
Milling, but was not a part of the decision in Totten as the issue was not decided.
The reported cases consistently held whites could not alienate Indian lands
except through the Crown, revealing a great deal about the short reach of
nineteenth century Ontario law. These reported cases, though fewer than fifteen
in number, represent no more than a minute fraction of the thousands of white
attempts to alienate Indian lands. The complexity of white schemes can be seen
in the above cases, and represents the range of devices employed in gaining
control of Indian lands. Bown v. West brought out the best legal minds in
54 Ibid. at 382.
55 (1856), 15 U.C.Q.B. 392.
56 M.E. Herrington, "Captain John Deserontyou and the Mohawk Settlement at Deseronto"
(1921-22) 29 Queen's Quarterly 165.
57 Supra note 55 at 393-94.
58 Ibid. at 396.
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Ontario. The court denied a white claim to Indian lands, but was clearly troubled
by the magnitude of the problem. 59 Isaac Davids, a Mohawk Indian on the Grand
River Reserve, assigned to a white man whatever interest he had in several
buildings and improvements on thirty-four acres of cleared land that he "owned"
according to the customary law of the Six Nations. Bown later entered a contract
to buy this interest in the land and the tavern located on it. After finding parts of
the ownership in dispute under tribal custom, a dispute arose over the value of
the property, and Bown rescinded the contract. 60 While the court's holding was
simple-no contract for exchange of Indian lands was valid-the complexity of
the land-holding arrangements in effect at Grand River at mid-century was
almost beyond the capacity of the law to adjudicate. Chief Justice John
Robinson, for example, indicated the Crown, while recognizing that Indian title
could not be acquired by whites, often protected white property rights to
improvements built upon Indian lands under traditional doctrines of equity.
Robinson further recognized that some interests of white occupiers were so
substantial that a court of equity could hardly refuse to acknowledge them.6'
The facts of Attorney General v. Price speak to exactly this type of problem.
The Crown's recognition of the equity of a white squatter created another legal
problem.62 White squatters occupied land on the Island of Point au Pelee under
an Indian lease negotiated in 1788. In 1859, the Crown obtained a judgment
against them for an illegal intrusion on Indian lands, but did not enforce it. Later,
in 1866, an order in Council was passed in Parliament, recommending that a
patent be issued to the settlers, in effect legalizing squatters' illegal occupation.
In the meantime, a third party cut timber from the lands. The Attorney General
intervened arguing that Indian lands were Crown lands; thus, the Crown was
entitled to the value of the timber. This view was upheld by the Court of
Chancery in an opinion authored by Oliver Mowat. 63 Thus, while the illegal
squatter had one kind of property interest recognized, the Crown had still
another interest in the property. The common element of all these cases is that
they involve whites claiming recognition of land rights somehow derived from
Indian title. Indian rights were lost or diminished, as most of these cases did not
directly involve Indian rights or Indians.
59 (1846), 1 U.C. Jur. (O.S.) 639; aff'd (1846), U.C.E. & A. 117 (Upper Canada Executive
Council).
60 Ibid. at 642-50.
61 Ibid. at 121.
62 (1868), 15 Gr. 304.
63 Ibid. at 304-306.
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B. INDIAN SALE OF TIMBER AND HAY TO FRONTIER WHITES
The same laws that forbade Indians from making any agreements regarding
lands with frontier whites also forbade them from entering agreements regarding
the timber, stone, hay and soil on those lands. The courts initially attempted to
apply the law in the same way, but were soon caught up in the contradictions of
the government policy of treating Indians as dependants: such a literal
interpretation of the law destroyed any possibility of reserve Indians contributing
to their own livelihood, further reducing them to dependency. The fact that the
courts came to treat these natural resources differently than land reveals that the
courts had the interpretive capacity to do so.
Of particular interest is the case of Feagan, who was arrested by an Indian
commissioner and criminally charged with trespass for purchasing cordwood
from John Peters, an Indian on the Grand River Reserve who cut the wood from
land he legally occupied. 64 The simple fact of this 1869 arrest by Indian
Department officials reveals that the Indian Department believed that cordwood
was subject to the same restrictions as land, and that it could not be legally
disposed of without permission. J. Martin, representing the Crown in the
prosecution of the case, argued:
Indians on reserve lands have no interest in the soil. They have the right
of occupation and cultivation, and of clearing their land for cultivation,
and of taking their necessary firewood for use upon the premises; they
have not the right of cutting and selling the timber without regard to
cultivation. 65
After the case was removed from Division Court to the Court of Queen's
Bench by certiorari as a special case the Court, in two different and inconsistent
opinions, ruled against the Crown, handing the Indian Department one of its first
legal defeats. Judge Wilson appears to have been troubled by the precise
limitation on the whole question of Indian title, ruling that since nothing in the
statutes forbade Indians from cutting and selling their timber, they must have the
right to do so. He implicitly found some kind of traditional property right to do
so, otherwise there would have been no other source of Indian interest in the
wood. This interpretation is consistent with Wilson's remarkable opening
assertion that "[t]he land either belongs to or is held by the Crown in trust for the
Indians."66 At the time, few legal minds in Ontario held this view. Virtually no
one conceded the Indians actually owned their reserves, and few acknowledged
64 Fegan v. McLean (1869), 29 U.C.Q.B. 202.
65 Ibid. at 203.
66 Ibid. at 204.
Vol. 56
"The Liberal Treatment of Indians"
the land was held in trust for them. Indians were "mere occupants" at the
pleasure of the Crown. 67
Judge Morrison concurred in the result, but used reasoning that neither
challenged the Indian Department nor conceded any Indian rights to the land.
Rather, Morrison simply held the evidence did not show that the cordwood was
not cut in clearing the land. The Indian right of occupancy must include the right
to clear the land for agricultural purposes; therefore, the wood might have been
legally cut and, having been legally cut, it could be legally sold. Morrison
endorsed the paternalism of the Indian Department by calling for more
regulations to protect the Indians from "any evil disposed person who may
prompt and induce an Indian so to destroy the property belonging to the whole
tribe", 68 apparently to make it easier to distinguish between firewood cut
expressly for sale to whites and firewood cut in furtherance of occupancy.
This case expanded on Vanvleck et al. v. Stewart et al.69 a much simpler case
decided nine years earlier on the same reserve. While Indian commissioners had
licenced the sale of a large quantity of saw logs, there was evidence that some
other logs were sold directly by the tribe to whites. At trial, the local judge
charged the jury that Indians on Indian reserve lands could cut and sell logs
without licence from the Crown. The Crown appealed citing, among other cases,
Baby,70 Strong,71 Hagar,72 and Totten,73 all of which referred to the sale of Indian
lands without licence, and failed to distinguish legally between Indian lands and
the resources from those lands. On appeal, the Court narrowly held that the
evidence supported the judgment, refusing to address the legal question raised.
In dicta, however, the Court indicated a great deal of confusion about the law
and the need for a new statute. 74
A later case, Regina v. Good, reveals that the Indian Department did not give
up on the issue. Good, a white man who married an Indian woman and farmed
on the Grand River Reserve, was convicted by a magistrate (all Indian Agents
were magistrates) of selling his own hay without permission of the Indian
Department and fined $20.75 Good appealed, arguing among other things, that
the statute could only mean "natural hay" that was the wild produce of the land
and not domesticated hay that he had sown and grown with his own labour. The
67 Ibid. at 204-205. This issue was to be fully argued in St. Catharine's Milling fifteen years later.
See infra note 181.
68 Ibid. at 205-206.
69 (1860), 19 U.C.Q.B. 489.
70 Supra note 43.
71 Supra note 49.
72 Supra note 52.
73 Supra note 55.
74 Supra note 69 at 490.
75 Regina v. Good (1889), 17 O.R. 725-27. The reported case contains no indication whether the
magistrate in this case was the Indian agent.
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Court held, following a simple rule of statutory construction, that the word "hay"
meant its common meaning, which is both wild and domesticated grasses dried
and prepared for feed. 76 The conviction was subsequently reversed on a
technicality concerning the way in which costs were assigned.77 This result
technically upheld the Indian Act, but refused to uphold the conviction entered
by the Indian agent, undermining the agent's legal authority.
A parallel case, Regina v. Fearman, also lead to reversal on a technicality. 78
An unnamed Indian woman had sold a quantity of wood without licence in
violation of the Indian Act. The wood had been seized and held by the Indian
Department on Johnson's property. Fearman and others entered the property and
took the wood in question. They were convicted of larceny, but appealed to the
High Court, arguing that the wood was not legally seized, thus not legally in the
custody of the Indian Department. At issue was a statutory requirement that such
a seizure of wood be ordered by a justice of the peace upon a written affidavit,
which the Indian Department had neglected to do. The High Court, citing the
principle of strict construction of a penal statute, reversed Fearman's conviction,
although the facts clearly showed that he had sold wood that he had no legal
right to sell.79 In both of these cases the position of the Indian Department could
have been upheld. It is not clear whether the Court intended to indicate
displeasure with some of the excesses of the department, or simply to hold the
department to the formal requirements of the law.
What is clear from both Fearman's theft of Indian Department wood and other
cases is that the Grand River Indians resisted the Indian Department's control
over their resources by freely violating the law. James Hunter, another Grand
River Indian arrested and jailed for selling cordwood, was not only convicted
and jailed by the Indian Agent acting as magistrate, but responded by bringing
assault charges against the agent, alleging illegal imprisonment.80 The case
illustrates a great deal of tension between the agent's exercise of his legal
powers and the Indians. Hunter had been tried by the Indian superintendent and
sentenced to pay a fine of $15 plus costs of $6.75 or serve thirty days in jail on
default. 8' Alleging wrongful imprisonment, Hunter was freed on a writ of habeas
corpus, after serving seven days in jail. He then charged the Indian
Superintendent, J.P. Gillickson, with assaulting and imprisoning him without
legal authority.82 The Queen's Bench Division of the High Court took little note
76 Ibid. at 726-27.
77 Ibid. at 727-28.
78 (1886), 10 O.R. 660.
79 Ibid. at 662-63 and 665-68.
80 Hunter v. Gilkison (1885), 7 O.R. 735.
81 Ibid. at 736.
82 Ibid. at 735 and 737.
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of Hunter's argument, finding that the Indian agent clearly had the authority of a
magistrate and acted legally.83
C. THE LEGAL STATUS OF INDIAN PEOPLE
While we can conclude that the property rights of Indians did not fare well in
nineteenth century Ontario courts, evidently leaving Indians the right to sell
nothing more than their own patented farms and some cordwood, the Ontario
courts were disingenuously protective of the juridical rights of individual
Indians. This, again, judicially reflected the government's Indian policy. While
Indians and their "property" (whatever property rights they had) were to be
paternalistically protected by the white government, individual Indians were
legally accorded the same rights as white people. This policy decision, British in
its origin, is the most important legal difference between nineteenth century
Canadian and American Indian law.84 As early as 1839, Chief Justice Macauley
had stated that Indians had "no claims to separate nationality such as would
except him from being amenable to the laws of the land." 85
It was always clear that Indians were competent witnesses. The issue was
raised in Regina v. Pah-Mah-Gay by the lawyer for the defendant, a Potawatomi
Indian sentenced to death at Sandwich in 1859 for shooting his brother in the
back while drunk.86 Ironically, Pah-Mah-Gay's attorney argued, on appeal, that
Esh-quay-gonabi, a young pagan Potawatomi, was not a competent witness
because, not being Christian, he had not been legally sworn to testify under oath.
This put the Crown in the position of defending the veracity of its only witness
whose testimony was essential to support the murder conviction and death
sentence passed on Pah-Mah-Gay. The High Court relied on several British
precedents holding that a Christian oath was not necessary; rather, any
affirmation that the witness knew of his obligation to speak the truth was
sufficient. 87 In dicta, the Court made clear that it was only swayed by the strong
precedent of British cases, and would have ordinarily concluded the testimony
83 Ibid. at 741-45.
84 The "Friends of the Indian" an American reform group, were actively arguing for the full
extension of American criminal and civil law to Indians in the 1880s and 1890s, citing
Canadian precedent for this policy. W.T. Hagan, The Indian Rights Association: The Herbert
Welsh Years, 1882-1904 (Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 1985).
85 D.C. Scott, "Indian Affairs 1867-1912" in A. Shortt & A.G. Doughty, eds., Canada and Its
Provinces: A History of the Canadian People and Their Institutions by One-Hundred
Associates, vol. 7 (Toronto: Glasgow, Brook, 1914) 593.
86 (1860), 20 U.C.Q.B. 195.
87 Ibid. at 196. The court cited Omichund v. Barker & Co., (I Atk. 21) a case arising in India. It
must be obvious there could have been no criminal law enforcement in any country in the
British Empire without fully accepting the testimony of native witnesses.
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was not admissible. 88 Possibly, the fact that it was the Crown that argued for
accepting Esh-quay-gonabi's testimony swayed the Court.
While Indians were clearly liable in civil actions for debt under the common
law, a protective statute forbade any person from "obtain[ing] any judgment for
any debt or pretended debt" except in special circumstances.89 This was an effort
to prevent whites from cheating Indians. This statute was repealed in 1869 and
was retroactively tested in McKinnon v. Van Every.90 A County Court judge had
held for a white plaintiff who attempted to collect retroactively for a debt
incurred by an Indian prior to 1869, arguing that the repeal of the statute had
changed the law and had made the Indian fully liable for debt under the law. On
appeal, the judgment was reversed. In refusing to give retroactive application to
a statute, the Court relied on technical rules of statutory construction and upheld
the public policy behind the statute, finding it could not subject every Indian in
the Province to lawsuits for debt for a period in which the Legislature had
prohibited persons from obtaining judgments against them.9' The repeal of this
statute left Indians subject to actions for debt, although there were substantial
exceptions for personal property on reserves. 92
Similarly, it was clear that Indians could make wills passing their personal
property, subject to the Indian Act. In Johnson v. Jones, the will of Catherine
Keshegoo, an Indian living on the Grand River Reserve, was challenged by her
half-brother and next of kin.93 She had left a substantial estate consisting of $400
in promissory notes and $414 in household furniture to another person, James
Johnson. Her brother relied on Section 20 of the Indian Act providing that if an
Indian male died holding a location ticket, that is an Indian agent's designation
of a place of habitation on a reserve, his lot and goods went to the next of kin. 94
Such provision did not apply to the will of Catherine Keshegoo because she was
not an Indian male. The Court held that Indians were citizens with all the rights
of other citizens except when interfered with by statute. 95 By this logic, Ms.
Keshegoo could leave her personal property to anyone she wished. However, her
location could not be bequeathed because Indians had no property right in their
reserves. The assignment of locations was a matter for the Indian agent, subject
to the statute.96
88 Ibid. at 197.
89 Infra note 90 at 284.
90 (1870), 5 P.R. 284.
91 Ibid. at 287.
92 Avery v. Cayuga (1913), 28 O.L.R. 517.
93 (1895), 26 O.R. 109.
94 Ibid. at 112.
95 Ibid. at 113-14.
96 Ibid. at 111-13.
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In his ruling, the judge cited Regina ex. rel Gibb v. White, among other cases,
for the proposition that Indians had the same rights as other Canadians.97
Thomas B. White, a Wyandotte Indian, was elected Reeve of the Township of
Anderson, Essex County. In addition to receiving monies as an enrolled member
of the tribe, White made a good living as a trader and owned patented lands in
fee simple. Dallas Norvell, the loser in the election, challenged the election,
arguing that White had never been enfranchised or exempted from any of the
disabilities of an Indian. 98
Judge Dalton's analysis was straightforward, beginning with a comparison of
the legal status of Indians in the United States and Canada. While Indians in the
United States were "aliens" and not citizens, it was so obvious that Indians were
full citizens of Canada that "authorities [were] needless for such a proposition."
While some provisions of the Indian Act protected the rights of reserve Indians,
it was clear that any Indian who left the reserve and patented his own lands
valued in excess of $100 was not an Indian within the meaning of these
provisions and enjoyed the full benefit of the law. The portion of the Indian Act
providing for the "enfranchisement" of Indians referred to Indians on reserves
still subject to the protection of the government. It did not apply to Indians, like
White, who entered into the mainstream of Canadian life. The only restrictions
applying to such Indians dealt with the disposition of lands acquired from the
tribe, the sale of spirituous liquors and holding in pawn anything pledged to
purchase such liquors. Accordingly, no provision of law was necessary to
provide for White's right to hold elective office: he was under the same law as
any other citizen.99
Another Indian, George W. Hill, of the Grand River Reserve, also functioned
successfully in white society until he was challenged and arrested for practicing
medicine without a licence. 00 Hill made the opposite argument of White,
alleging that as an Indian enrolled on a reserve, he was subject to federal law,
not to Ontario law or Ontario police regulations.101 The courts spent a
considerable amount of time on the case. They futilely looked to both the Indian
Act (which was silent on the practice of medicine) and the relevant Ontario
statute (which was also silent on the question of Indians practicing medicine).
The Court of Appeal avoided difficult questions pertaining to the application of
Ontario statutes to the activities of reserve Indians, and held that the Indian Act
did not limit the activities of Indians. Therefore, when an Indian freely chose to
leave the reserve and to engage in a wide sphere of activities, he put himself
97 (1870), 5 P.R. 315.
98 Ibid. at 316.
99 Ibid. at 318.
100 Rex v. Hill (1908), 15 O.L.R. 406.
101 Ibid. at 409-11.
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under the same regulations as other people. 0 2 The Court specifically withheld
judgment on whether Ontario law could prevent an Indian from practicing
medicine on his reserve. 103
The problem here was that the British North America Act specifically
relegated jurisdiction over "Indians and Lands Reserved for the Indians" to the
federal government.' o4 In an earlier case, Re John Milloy and the Municipal
Council of the Township of Onondaga, a municipal ordinance regulating
domestic animals running at large, had been challenged on the ground that part
of the township included part of the Grand River Reserve and the township had
no authority to make regulations governing the reserve. 105 This was particularly
true in view of the fact that the Indian Act specifically gave Indians on reserves
the right of limited self-government, including the regulation of domestic
animals. Citing the British North America Act, the Common Pleas Division of
the High Court upheld the by-law, holding that it could regulate the non-Indian
lands within the township even though it could not apply to Indian lands. 106
Moreover, the Court noted that no Indian had objected to the by-law and the
Township had made no effort to enforce the law on the reserve. The objection of
a white man on these grounds raised an issue that would have no impact on the
litigant, regardless of how it was decided. 107
Juridical citizenship did not imply Indians had the same measure of justice
under law as whites. Indians were cheated by whites in many ways: these
injustices rarely reached the courts. When they did, local courts, responsive to
local prejudice, could not be depended on to protect the rights of individual
Indians. Owens, a blind and illiterate Indian who did not speak English, was sold
a pair of horses for $270 by Tracy, a white man. Later, Tracy presented Owens
with a paper to sign. According to witnesses, Owens asked to have the paper
read to him but Tracy refused, saying it was of no consequence. Owens signed
the paper, which turned out to be a mortgage on the horses.108
At trial, Tracy testified he had explained the document to Owens as best he
could, but had not read it to him. Another witness, who had accompanied Tracy
as an interpreter, testified that he had cautioned Owens against signing the paper
and that Owens had "partly" stated he agreed to a mortgage. The jury found for
Tracy: clearly an injustice based on this evidence. On appeal, the Court of
Common Pleas reversed the judgment and ordered a new trial. Instead of basing
102 Ibid. at 410.
103 Ibid. at 414.
104 BNA Act, s. 24. For a complete text and analysis of the British North America Act see W.H.
McConnell, Commentary on the British North America Act (Toronto: MacMillan of Canada,
1977). Indians and Lands Reserved for the Indians are discussed at 222-27.
105 (1885), 6 O.R. 573.
106 Ibid. at 573 and 578-79.
107 Ibid. at 579.
108 Owens v. Thomas (1856), 6 U.C.C.P. 383.
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this judgment on a ruling that would specify Indian rights under such
circumstances, the court based it on English common law, requiring that
contracts be read to blind persons to be complete.109
With the exception of some confusion over the reach of Ontario police
regulations into Indian reserves, there was no question that Ontario Indians were
citizens fully subject to Ontario law, limited only by a few minor provisions of
the Indian Act. By and large, Ontario courts did not challenge the scope of the
Indian Act and, at least with regard to the status of individual Indians, there were
no significant legal challenges to federal power. At the same time, it is clear that
Ontario courts neither recognized the unique status of Indians within the
province, nor took into account the reality of the racism and crime against
Indians by local whites. Such conditions created serious problems for any
Indians attempting to assert their legal rights in local courts. For many Indians,
simple evidentiary problems must have prevented them from getting their
injuries redressed in court. Although Owens had no evidentiary problem, he still
lost before a local jury on a particularly egregious fact pattern: blind men cannot
execute binding contracts in foreign languages without having the contract read
to them. How many Ontario Indians had such a clear set of facts on which to
base an appeal from a local court?
D. LAWS REGULATING THE SALE OF LIQUOR TO INDIANS
Selling liquor to Indians appears to have been something of a frontier folk
crime, widely engaged in and often, but ineffectively prosecuted. The scope of
this prohibition was broader than the rest of the Indian Act, in that it covered all
Indians regardless of their physical location or legal status)'10 More reported
Ontario cases deal with this issue than any other issue of Indian law, a glaring
example of the reality of nineteenth century Indian life. These cases also
illustrate the focus of nineteenth century Indian law, a law more concerned with
the forced assimilation of Indians than with the protection of Indian rights.
A typical case is Regina v. McAuley, which challenged the scope of the
magisterial authority of an Indian Agent."' On the testimony of an Indian,
Simeon Rocky-Mountain, Agent Duncan McPhee of Rama Indian Reserve
convicted Alexander McAuley, a hotel keeper, of selling beer and whisky to four
Indians. The testimony showed not only that McAuley's wife had actually
served the liquor, but also that McAuley had been away from his hotel working
at a lumber camp in another county when the liquor was sold.112 There is no
109 Ibid. at 384.
110 (1870), 5 P.R. 80.
"'I (1887), 14 OR. 643.
112 Ibid. at 646.
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question that Mrs. McAuley was in the business of selling liquor to Indians.
These facts were of no concern to either Agent McPhee or the Court of Common
Pleas, following the common law rule that the act of the wife was that of the
husband.'"3 McAuley was convicted and fined $50 or ninety days in jail. Having
failed to pay the fine, he was arrested on a warrant and taken to jail.a14
The Court was, however, very concerned with the precise limits of the
magisterial powers of an Indian Agent. Those powers appeared to be quite broad
under the statute, giving Indian agents the same powers as police magistrates
over "any infraction" brought under the Indian Act.'15 The Court set out to
determine the scope of McPhee's powers. This inquiry must have been a bit
disingenuous given that McPhee had tried McAuley on the Rama Indian Reserve
for a sale of liquor that had occurred in Rama Township, adjacent the reserve.
The Court found that McPhee had magistrate's powers at Rama and in the
County of Ontario, consistent with the intent and scope of the Indian Act.
However, the Court also found that McPhee was the "agent for the Chippewa
Indians at Rama" and that the indictment was defective because it did not allege
that the Indians involved were Chippewa Indians. 116 McAuley's conviction was
reversed. Such a limitation on McPhee's powers was pure nonsense under the
Indian Act, especially since Indians always moved relatively freely from one
reserve to another and the Agent's task was broadly defined as a general
supervision of Indian activity in his area.
This interpretation of the act in McAuley seems especially dishonest in view of
Regina v. Green, a case arising a year later.t11 Green, an Indian, was convicted in
Brantford's police magistrate's court of selling liquor to an Indian and sentenced
to four months in jail at hard labour. On appeal, he argued he had been charged
with selling liquor on September 27 but was convicted of selling liquor on
September 29. The Indian Act, apparently in recognition of the rough quality of
rural or frontier justice, contained a provision that "no conviction ...shall be
quashed for want of form...and no warrant of commitment shall be held void by
reason of any defect therein...if there is a good and valid conviction to sustain
the same."118 The Judge held where an offence "clearly proved over which the
convicting magistrate has jurisdiction" the conviction must be upheld.'11 9
Regina v. Murdock2o is consistent with the Ontario courts' lack of concern
with legal technicalities not going to jurisdiction. In this case, a defective
conviction for selling liquor to Indians was amended on appeal, correcting the
113 Ibid. at 649-50.
114 Ibid. at 646.115 Ibid. at 65 1.
116 Ibid. at 653-54.
117 (1888), 12 P.R. 373.
118 Ibid. at 374-75.
119 Ibid. at 376.
120 (1900), 27 O.A.R. 443.
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defect so that the conviction could be upheld. The Indian agent, acting as a
police magistrate, neglected to assert that the person to whom the liquor was sold
was an Indian, clearly a substantial issue, similar to failing to allege the tribe of
the Indians as in McAuley. The appellate court noted the record was silent on this
issue and found that the sale had occurred on the Grand River Reserve, and that
the law prohibited the sale of liquor "to a person" on an Indian reserve as well as
to Indians.121
Additional evidence of the hostility of Ontario courts to the criminal
jurisdiction of Indian agents acting as police magistrates under federal authority
can be found in Regina v. MacKenzie.122 J.P. Gilkinson, Indian Agent at Grand
River Reserve, tried James MacKenzie for selling liquor to Andrew Statts, an
Indian, in the city of Brantford. MacKenzie refused to appear before Gilkinson,
alleging he was prejudiced against him, but was represented by his lawyer.
Gilkinson insisted on proceeding with the trial and MacKenzie's lawyer
withdrew from the proceedings. Gilkinson declared the case closed, with no
evidence being offered for the defence. Three days later, in the presence of
MacKenzie and his lawyer, the judgment was read: MacKenzie was found guilty
and was fined $50 or three months in jail upon default of payment. MacKenzie
appealed, alleging eight errors in the trial.123
His conviction was reversed on two grounds. First, his sentence to jail in
default of fine was unlawful since the statute provided for a fine and
imprisonment. This defect could easily have been corrected on appeal. Second,
the Court of Common Pleas found that the evidence did not establish that the
liquor was not used under the sanction of a medical man or minister of religion,
which were legal uses under the statute.124 Legality of the use, a part of the
burden of proof, was not raised at trial. Arguably, it was both a defence to the
charge and an error of the type that appellate courts might correct on appeal from
the record. 125 MacKenzie, for example, also alleged that nothing in the record
showed Statts to be an Indian, an equally important element of the prosecution's
burden, but the appellate court was not moved by this argument. Young, a tavern
keeper in the Village of Caledonia charged with selling liquor without a licence
and selling liquor to Indians, had lost a similar appeal the same year, despite
arguing it had not been proven that he did not have a licence.126 The appellate
court held the burden was on Young to prove he was licenced.12 7
121 Ibid. at 444-45.
122 (1884),6 O.R. 165.
123 Ibid. at 166-68.
124 Ibid. at 169.
125 Regina v. White (1871), 21 U.C.C.P. 354 at 356 was cited by the Court for the proposition that
under a few circumstances liquor could be legally provided to Indians.
126 Regina v. Young (1884), 7 O.R. 88.
127 Ibid. at 89.
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Nineteenth century Ontario jails were filled with Indians charged with being
intoxicated. The whites who sold them liquor did considerably better in court.
Appellate courts showed an inconsistency in their tolerance of technical defects
in such convictions, but appeared to have some reservations about the police
magistrate's powers of Indian agents, which led them to overturn some of their
convictions on minor technical grounds. The message to the Indian agents was to
restrict their power to Indians and to Indian reserves, and to be cautious about
extending their jurisdiction to local whites.
E. INDIANS UNDER CANADIAN CRIMINAL LAW
The same general rule that Indians were fully subject to Canadian law also
applied to criminal law: Indians were frequently convicted of crimes in
nineteenth century Ontario. The range and type of these convictions will be dealt
with in more detail in section III. Here the focus is confined to the legal basis of
this criminal jurisdiction. It appears to have been so obvious that Indians were
fully subject to Canadian jurisdiction that the lawyer of Pah-Mah-Gay, trying
desperately to save the life of a client sentenced to death for murder, did not
even raise the jurisdictional issue in his appeal. Rather, he unsuccessfully
challenged the admissibility of the evidence of a pagan witness.128 Similarly, the
jurisdictional issue was not challenged by attorneys for Sam Pah-Mah-Gay who
was charged in 1858 with murder.129
Only slightly more troubling for the courts was the question of mens rea, the
problem of punishing Natives for offences when they lacked any wrongful
intent.130 Regina v. Machekequonabe is among the best known Native law cases
in the common law world, holding an Ojibwa Indian criminally responsible for
manslaughter after he killed a "windigo," an evil spirit clothed in human flesh.131
The case arose at Sabascon Lake, in the wilderness of Northwestern Ontario,
among Indians who had little contact with Canadian society. Machekequonabe
was one of eight Indians placed on sentry duty because a windigo had been seen
and villagers feared they would be harmed. On seeing what they believed to be a
windigo, Machekequonabe and another sentry chased and challenged the
unknown figure, a large human form wrapped in a blanket. Finally, in the dark
128 Regina v. Pah-Mah-Gay (1861), 20 U.C.Q.B. 195, 197-99.
129 Regina v. Sam Pah-Mah-Gay, RG 22, file 392-0-2646.
130 R.B. Seidman, "Witch Murder and Mens Rea" (1965) 28 Mod. L.R. 46; "Mens Rea and the
Reasonable African: The Pre-Scientific World-View and Mistake of Fact" (1966) 15 Int'l &
Comp. L.Q. 1135.
131 (1897), 28 O.R. 309 (Div. Ct.). George Nelson, a fur trader, provides a classic account of the
windigo in Ojibwa life. See J.S.H. Brown & R. Brightman, The Orders of the Dreamed:
George Nelson on Cree and Northern Ojibwa Religion and Myth, 1823 (Winnipeg: University
of Manitoba Press, 1988). A windigo execution under tribal law is described at 92-93.
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Machekequonabe fired, tragically killing his own foster father.132 The trial court
rejected the mens rea defence and the defence of insanity and convicted him of
manslaughter, sparing him from the death penalty for intentional murder.
33
The Indian Department financed an appeal. In Divisional Court,
Machekequonabe's lawyer argued the common law defence of mistake of fact.
34
The Divisional Court refused to look beyond the narrow question of whether
there was adequate evidence to support the jury verdict, ignoring the question of
law posed by the defence. The verdict was upheld.35 Perhaps illustrating the trial
court's own difficulties with the case, Machekequonabe was given a
comparatively light sentence of six months in jail.136 Many whites, while broadly
defending Canadian jurisdiction over the criminal activity of Indians, were
troubled by the court's failure to take any cognizance of the subjective fear of an
Ojibwa band of the windigo. The transcript paints a vivid picture of a band of
Indians in real danger, as posting eight sentries illustrates. The intricate and very
real cultural world of the Ojibwa found no recognition in Ontario courts. A
string of windigo cases followed over the next twenty years in central Canada,
leading to similar results. 137
What were the goals of Canadian justice in such cases? There is direct
evidence of this in the case of Rex v. Tushwegeh, another Ojibwa murder case
from Northwestern Ontario.13 8 Tushwegeh, for unknown reasons but quite
possibly believing he was killing a windigo, strangled Geeshingoose, his
brother-in-law, in their camp at Cat Lake. Upon hearing the story of the crime, a
police constable was sent to Cat Lake to gather evidence. Unfortunately, this
132 Regina v. Machekequonabe, ibid. at 309. A transcript of this case survives in the Canadian
National Archives, RG 13, vol. 2089. This account of the killing is on pages 4 and 5 of the
transcript.
133 Ibid. at 310.
134 This defence essentially removes the mens rea of intending a criminal act. See E.R. Keedy,
"Ignorance and Mistake in the Criminal Law" (1908-1909) 22 Harv. L. Rev. 75; R.M. Perkins,
"Ignorance and Mistake in Criminal Law" (1939-40) 88 Univ. of Pennsylvania L. Rev. 35.
135 Regina v. Machekequonabe, supra note 131 at 311. Correspondence relating to the appeal and
a handwritten outline of the appellate argument is held in the Canadian National Archives, RG
13, vol. 2089.
136 Letter of A.J. Wink, Barrister at Law, Port Arthur, Ontario to Oliver Mowat, Ontario Minister
of Justice (9 December 1896), contained in Canadian National Archives, RG 13, vol. 2089.
137 See Queen v. Payoo and Npaysoosee, an unreported Northwest Territories case of 1899,
printed in "The Killing of Moostoos the Wehtigoo" in Archaeological Report, 1903, Appendix
to the Report of the Minister of Education, Ontario, 1903, Ontario Sessional Papers, vol. 36,
part 5, 1904; and Chief T. Fiddler & J.R. Stevens, Killing the Shamen (Toronto: Penumbra
Press, 1985). A complete listing of the windigo killings is found in M.I. Teicher, "Windigo
Psychosis: A Study of a Relationship Between Belief and Behavior Among the Indians of
Northeastern Canada" in Proceedings of the American Ethnological Society, 1960 (Seattle:
American Ethnological Society, 1960) 44. Teicher reports 36 nineteenth century cases and 10
twentieth century cases.




constable died before his evidence could be given, raising the issue of whether
another officer should be sent for another attempt to gather evidence. Ontario
Department of Justice officials were reluctant to proceed with "such a doubtful
case," now two years old. The Indian Department, however, took a different
view and, through the Canadian Department of Justice, prevailed over Ontario
officials. It was "important that this Indian be put on trial even though prospects
of seeing conviction [were] extremely weak, as it [was] necessary that the
Indians should understand they [were] within reach of the strong arm of the
law."' 139 Tushwegeh was brought out of the wilderness in November of 1905, but
it was too late in the year to bring out the witnesses. He was held in jail all
winter, and finally tried at Kenora in the summer of 1906. He was acquitted
because the evidence was inadequate. Nevertheless, the criminal law had served
its purpose. It had extended the power of the Canadian state to the farthest
reaches of the country. 140 Because the law could effectively be used to control
and socialize Native people, it was a powerful instrument to force assimilation.
Therefore, the symbolic reach of the law, showing Native people that they must
defer to Canadian power, was more important than convictions and prison
sentences. 141
F. FAMILY LAW
Matters involving Indian family law simply were not taken to the Ontario
courts. The one case that was decided, Robb v. Robb, considered the legality of a
marriage under tribal law. The decision was treated with exceptional hostility,
testing even the limits of the excessive reliance on judicial formalism of Ontario
law.142 John Robb died, leaving his estate to his son, William Robb, or his son's
heirs. Since William had died, his daughter, Sarah Jane Robb, stepped forward to
claim the estate, but was sued by John Robb's wife, who claimed that Sarah was
illegitimate and thus not entitled to her father's inheritance. On the facts, a clear
case could be made for a marriage under tribal law. In 1869, William journeyed
to Vancouver Island and married an Indian woman named Supul-Catle, daughter
of Wah-Kus, chief of the Comox tribe. Wah-Kus had given a feast in honor of
139 Ibid. Letter of Deputy Minister of Justice to Deputy Attorney General of Ontario (15 March
1906).
140 Exactly ten years later Canadian law reached the farthest comer of the country when an RCMP
patrol reached the Arctic Ocean at the mouth of the Copper River to arrest Sinnisiak and
Uluksuk, two Copper Inuit accused of the murder of two Roman Catholic priests. R.G. Moyles,
British Law and Arctic Men: The Celebrated 1917 Murder Trials of Sinnisiak and Uluksuk,
First Inuit Tried Under White Man's Law (Saskatoon: Western Producer Prairie Books, 1979).
141 On the symbolic purposes of early Canadian law in the Arctic, see Harring, supra note 16 at
62-63; on the Northwest Coast see D. Cole & t. Chaikin, An Iron Hand Upon the People: The
Law Against the Potlatch on the Northwest Coast (Vancouver: Douglas & Mctntyre, 1990).
142 (1890), 20 O.R. 591 (Common Pleas).
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the couple and presents had been exchanged, indicating an acceptance by all
parties of family obligations. The couple lived in Wah-Kus' home for nearly ten
years until the death of Supul-Catle. Robb then took their daughter back to
Kingston, introducing her as his child, and raising her in his parents' house. He
claimed he had been legally married to the child's mother.143
Judge Robertson, of the Ontario Court of Common Pleas, rejected these facts
as proof that a legal marriage existed.'" In so doing, he did not follow Canada's
leading case on the legal status of Indian marriages, Connolly v. Woolrich,
which, on incredibly similar facts, upheld the legality of such marriages.45
Robertson's legal reasoning had nothing to do with any idea of legally
recognizing tribal institutions and customs. For him, the two cases were
distinguished by geography: Connolly, a trader whose "moral character was
beyond reproach" (evidently an adverse comment on the moral character of
Robb), would have had to travel "3,000 to 4,000 miles in canoes, or on foot, to
get married by a priest or magistrate." Robb, on the other hand, was within the
jurisdiction of British Columbia, presumably within reach of such authorities,
therefore, he could have contracted a marriage under British Columbia law if he
had desired. 146 Moreover, Robertson was reluctant to accord tribal marriages any
legal status under Ontario law due to his concerns that the Comox were pagans
and practiced plural marriages.147 Finally, after again rejecting any recognition of
a marriage under Comox tribal law or custom, Robertson recognized the
marriage under the common law maxim that "when a doubt exists as to the
legality of a marriage, courts of justice are bound to decide in favour of the
alleged marriage."148 The fact of simple geography distinguished the two
marriages and provided Judge Robertson with a basis for believing that a legal
marriage might have occurred: Robb had access to British Columbia magistrates
143 Ibid. at 592-93.
144 Ibid. at 595-96.
145 (1867), 11 L.C. Jur. 197 (Superior Ct.). This case is discussed in C. Backhouse, Petticoats and
Prejudice: Women and Law in Nineteenth-Century Canada (Toronto: Women's Press, 1991) at
9-28. Connolly, while in the employ of the Hudson's Bay Company, had married an Indian
woman according to tribal custom, and brought his family back to Montreal. Later, he
abandoned his wife and, without bothering to obtain a divorce, married another woman. Upon
Connolly's death, his Indian wife sued for a share in his estate. The Quebec court held the
marriage under tribal law was legal under Quebec law.
146 Judge Robertson's gratuitous comment on Connolly's moral character in view of his close
knowledge of the facts of the case, which centered on Connolly's abandonment of his Indian
wife and their children, can only be understood as a reflection of his racism. He would surely
have seen Connolly's actions as morally reprehensible according to the values of Victorian
Ontario if he had abandoned his white wife and their family. Moreover, Robertson was wildly
ignorant of both Canadian geography and Canadian history. By the mid-nineteenth century
missionaries of many denominations were attending to the Indians of the Northwest and no
place in Athabasca was more than 1,000 miles from a clergyman, far less in many cases.
147 Supra note 142 at 596-97.
148 Ibid. at 597.
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and clergy.149 Thus, while the courts of Quebec explicitly recognized marriages
under Indian law or custom, Ontario courts expressly rejected this view. Robb's
marriage was only valid because there was a legal presumption that he had
contracted a legal marriage under British Columbia law. This judicial attitude,
coupled with the paucity of cases, clearly suggests that family matters involving
Indian custom were not brought to Ontario courts. 50
G. FISH AND GAME LAWS
The only major area of Indian activity for which there are no reported Ontario
cases is criminal prosecution under fish and game laws. Although there appears
to have been a substantial number of prosecutions, none led to reported cases,
doubtlessly reflecting the lack of individual Indian defendant's resources to
finance appeals. The records of the Ontario Attorney General clearly indicate
that Ontario denied Indians any right to hunt and fish, holding Indians to the
same fish and game laws as whites. William McKirdy, a trader at Nipigon Lake,
directly posed this question in an 1892 letter to the Attorney General. McKirdy
pointed out that Indians in his region had "no means of living except from
fishing and hunting and serious results [would] follow from applying Ontario
fish and game laws."'15
The province's answer was disingenuous: J.M. Gibson, Provincial Secretary,
wrote that although Ontario laws did apply, the laws specifically provided that
"Indians or settlers in unorganized districts could kill game for food or
necessities of life, but not for sale or traffic."152 That was exactly the point.
McKirdy wrote back immediately, arguing that hunting was of no use unless the
Indians could sell their furs. 153
The Indians hunted anyway, risking the punishment of Ontario law. Thomas
Fox was arrested in 1909 for illegal possession of ten beaver pelts. He received a
jail sentence, but the magistrate suspended it because Fox had no ability to pay.
149 Ibid. at 596.
150 Ontario was not unique in refusing to recognize Indian marriages under customary law. This
legal recognition of Indian marriages did not extend to plural marriages in the West which were
prosecuted under Canadian law by the end of the nineteenth century. Bear's Shin Bone, a
Blood Indian, appears to have been jailed on bigamy charges in 1899. Tite Queen v. "Bear's
Shin Bone" (1899), [1898-1901] 4 Terr. L.R. 173.
151 Letter of William McKirdy to Attorney General, Ontario Provincial Archives, RG 8, Series, I-
1-D, no. 3257 (1892).
152 Telegram of Gibson to McKirdy, Ontario Provincial Archives, RG 8, Series, 1-1-D, no. 3257 (4
July 1892).
153 Letter of McKirdy to Gibson, ibid.
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Since the statute did not provide for a suspended sentence, the Attorney General
was asked for a ruling. The Attorney General ruled the magistrate "has no power
to suspend sentence" but recognizing the hopelessness of the situation, he added
that "it might be better to let the matter stand."54
A year later, W.F. Langworthy, Crown Attorney at Thunder Bay, wrote for
instructions on the same matter. Two Indians had been arrested for shooting a
moose near Sturgeon Lake and were defended in court by their Indian Agent.
Even though the shooting occurred off the reserve, the Agent argued that the
Robinson Treaty gave the Indians the right to hunt. The Attorney General again
replied that the position of the Province was that Indians were subject to the
same fish and game laws as others, denying any legal impact of the Robinson
Treaty on Ontario law. 55
Doubtlessly, the arrogance of the Ontario government caused much suffering
among the Indians, especially in Northern and Western Ontario. It also caused at
least one death. Pierre Hunter, an Ojibwa hunter from Sioux Lookout charged
with hunting moose out of season, froze to death in the winter of 1915-16 after
being discharged from prison with no money. In the fall of 1914, Hunter had
been warned by an Ontario Fish and Game officer, George Fanning, of a report
that he and another Indian were selling moose meat at night in Sioux Lookout.
Threatened with jail, he had agreed to return to his home at Wako and stop
hunting. Three weeks later, Fanning heard that Hunter had shot two large moose,
leaving the meat for white men and Indians to see, saying he would get even
with the game warden. The next fall, Hunter returned to Sioux Lookout and
started selling moose again. He was arrested by Fanning and taken before a
police magistrate. Sentenced to a fine of $20 and costs or thirty days in jail, he
was taken to jail in Port Arthur because he had no money. Asked to file a report
after Hunter's death, Fanning stated he had no regrets as "sending him to jail
done him no harm...but it did the Indians around here considerable good." 56
Ontario's interpretation and application of its fish and game laws to Indians was
simply wrong, a legal arrogance not corrected until the middle of the twentieth
century. 57
154 Memorandum of Attorney General to Cartwright, Ontario Provincial Archives, RG 1, file 1799
(1907).
155 Letters of Langworthy to AG; AG to Langworthy, Ontario Provincial Archives, RG 4, file 898
(1910). On the Robinson Treaties, see The Treaties of Canada, supra note 28 at 16-21.
156 RG 4, file 1572 (1916).
157 D.E. Sanders, "Indian Hunting and Fishing Rights" (1973-74) 38:1 Sask. L. Rev. 45; and
"Hunting Rights-Provincial Laws-Application on Indian Reserves" (1973-74) 38:1 Sask. L.
Rev. 234; P.A. Cumming & N.H. Mickenberg, eds., Native Rights in Canada, 2d ed. (Toronto:
General Publishing, 1972) c. 20: "The Law of Native Hunting and Fishing Rights" at 207; and
Hawley, supra note 9 at 5-9.
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These cases, taken together, show a substantial amount of legal activity
involving Indians in nineteenth century Ontario. Few consistent doctrines of
Indian law emerged from the Ontario courts as was the case in United States
courts. Despite a clear denial of Indian land title and a clear recognition of
Indian legal rights in other areas of law, courts were conservative in their
approach to questions of Native law, relying heavily but inconsistently on
judicial formalism, the endless citation of technicalities of law in ways that
obscured the clear policy choices the courts were making. 158 It cannot be said
that the courts followed the policies set out by the executive branch by rote. For
example, a clear Indian Department policy of punishing the sale of liquor to
Indians was not given full effect by the courts when it would have been quite
simple to do so. Similarly, Indian Department paternalism in controlling Indian
resources was deemed inappropriate by the courts and judges weakened the
capacity of the Indian Department to control Indian wood and hay. Perhaps in
both areas of liquor law enforcement and the control of Indian resources, local
white interests conflicted with national policies and the Ontario courts were
responsive to local interests. This local/national conflict is at the core of Indian
law, both in Canada and the United States, and is traditionally one of the
foundations of the idea that Indian Affairs are matters of national, not local
concern.
II. ST. CATHARINE'S MILLING: THE INDIAN TITLE
CASES
There is no question that the major contribution of the nineteenth century
Ontario judiciary to Canadian Indian law is St. Catharine's Milling and Lumber
Company v. Attorney General of Ontario.159 This is true not only because the
case arose in Ontario, but because Ontario lawyers and judges determined both
the argument and disposition of the case from beginning to end, with their
arguments convincing both the fledgling Supreme Court of Canada and the Privy
Council. The case represented a great political victory for Ontario and the
provinces over the Dominion government. Native people, who were not even
parties to the case, were even greater losers. They were denied the ownership of
their ancestral lands, although they were left with some lesser usage rights.
158 A.E.K. Nash, "Fairness and Formalism in the Trials of Blacks in the State Supreme Courts of
the Old South" (1970) 56 Va. L. 64; and "Reason of Slavery: Understanding the Judicial Role
in the Peculiar Institution" (1979) 32 Vand. L. Rev. 7.
159 "Aboriginal Title", supra note 26, especially at 57. See also Calder et al. v. Attorney-General
of British Columbia, [1973] S.C.R. 313 at 320-23.
Vol. 56
"The Liberal Treatment of Indians"
At the core of this dispute was control of Ontario's vast lands. Under the
British North America Act, Indian lands and Indians were clearly under federal
jurisdiction. Crown lands within the provinces were under provincial
jurisdiction.160 This federal arrangement became the political foundation of
Canada.
The first case to implicate the difficulties involved was Bown v. West.161 It
involved a suit for breach of a contract to sell Indian lands on the Grand River
Reserve. The Court of Chancery denied relief on the ground that Indian lands
were vested in the Crown, hence could not be contracted for sale. In reality, this
holding was narrower than it appeared because the Grand River Iroquois had
received their lands from the Crown and were not traditional occupants. 162
Given the unique legal history of Grand River land title, Church v. Fenton was
the most important land title case prior to St. Catharine's Milling. 63 The lands
involved were Indian lands, surrendered to the Crown by the Indians in 1854,
and held by the Indian Department as "Indian lands" under the control of the
Dominion government. The Dominion sold the land to whites, with the first of
ten annual installments to be paid in 1857. Upon completion of payment, a
patent dated June 14, 1869 was issued. In 1870, the land was sold because taxes
were in arrears for 1864-1869. The owner argued that until the land was
patented, it was still "Indian lands" under Dominion jurisdiction and was not
subject to provincial taxes. This issue was significant because Indian lands were
commonly sold in installments and a substantial proportion of the frontier tax
base was in question. Also involved was a larger issue of federalism-the reach
of Dominion powers into local provincial matters.
Much Indian land was disposed of in this way, with proceeds held "for the
benefit of the Indians." In theory, the Dominion's expensive Indian policy could
be self-supporting. Ultimately, most of the Indian lands in Ontario were sold to
whites. For example, the Grand River Reserve was reduced to less than ten
percent of its original size.64 This policy was of great benefit to local whites and
to the Province as the land became taxable under provincial jurisdiction.
160 BNA Act, s. 24. The entire discussion which follows treats a legal issue of great complexity in a
few pages. See e.g., B. Slattery, The Land Rights of Indigenous Canadian Peoples, supra note
24; B. Clark, Indian Territory: Crown Rights Inchoate (M.A. Thesis, University of Western
Ontario, 1986); and D. Johnston, The Taking of Indian Lands in Canada: Consent or
Coercion? (Saskatoon: University of Saskatchewan Native Law Centre, 1989).
161 (1845)11 Grants Chancery 639.
162 The legal status of the Grand River Reserve is still at issue. See supra note 29.
163 (1878), 28 C.P. 384.
164 While most Indian lands were paternalistically "sold" by the government for the "benefit" of
Native people, Chief Joseph Brant oversaw the sale of Grand River Iroquois lands. C.M.
Johnston, ed., The Valley of the Six Nations: A Collection of Documents on the Indian Lands of
the Grand River (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1964).
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However, the policy contributed to increasing poverty of the Indians, and
deprived tribes of their economic base.
The Ontario Court of Common Pleas' decision in Church v. Fenton is
illuminating. The court took a long detour into the nature of Indian title that was
not necessary to support its judgment. Judge Gwynne held the lands were subject
to taxation and tax sale by broadly interpreting a pre-confederation statute which
made assigned Crown lands subject to local taxation to include assigned Indian
lands. He analogized that Indian lands were simply a type of Crown land sold in
the same way, for the same purpose and therefore subject to the same Act.165
Indian title was dealt with specifically by asserting that the Crown had a "right
by conquest" over Indian lands, but had "waived" that right and had chosen to
extinguish Indian title by "treaty of surrender."166 The Court went on to describe
this arrangement as the basis of the "expression" to the effect that certain lands
were vested in the Crown "in trust" for Indians. Although the legal basis of this
trust arrangement was openly doubted by the Court, it held the legal basis was
irrelevant to the outcome of this particular case. 167
Recognizing that Indian lands were held "in trust" would have given the tribes
an actionable property right in their lands. It was clear that Ontario courts did not
accept the trust doctrine, dismissing it as irrelevant. Instead, the Court in Church
v. Fenton asserted a fictional "right by conquest": Ontario lands had never been
taken from the Indians by conquest. This false assertion was not challenged, and
provided much of the basis for Ontario's case in St. Catharine's Milling. Indian
lands were indistinguishable from Crown lands as all land in Canada was swept
under the Crown by a noble conquest of an empty new world. Church did not
directly decide any questions of Indian title: it simply turned on matters of
frontier tax policy under Canadian federalism.
The historical context of St. Catharine's Milling is thoroughly documented.168
St. Catharine's Milling, the most extensively litigated Native rights case in
Ontario prior to Bear Island, involved Indian title only in an obscure way.
Ontario and the Dominion government each claimed title to Indian lands, but
each based possession of those lands on different theories of acquisition from the
Indians and the process of alienation of Indian title. Upon Confederation, title to
Crown lands within the provinces went to the provinces, while responsibility for
Indian lands went to the Dominion government. This created an obvious
potential for conflict. St. Catharine's Milling and Lumber Company was an
Ottawa corporation that took a lease from the Dominion government on an
extensive tract of pinelands at Wabigoon Lake near Dryden in Northwestern
Ontario.
165 Supra note 163 at 395-401.
166 Ibid. at 388.
167 Ibid. at 388.
168 Supra note 11.
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Perhaps more important than the reported opinions are the respective
arguments of both Ontario and the Dominion about the nature of Indian title, for
these arguments represent the best legal analysis on issues of Native rights
available in Canada at the time. The Dominion government claimed that it had
taken the lands from the Ojibwa through their land surrender in Treaty Three, the
North-West Angle Treaty of 1873.169 According to this view, these lands were
"Indian lands" until ceded to the Dominion government by treaty and were
therefore "Indian lands" at Confederation in 1867. Ontario claimed the lands
were Crown lands because the Indians held no title. Rather, they possessed a
lesser right to occupy and use the lands. Therefore, Ontario argued the Dominion
government had negotiated a treaty for political purposes only (to ensure good
relations with the Indians), and had not acquired any proprietary interest in the
land through the treaties. It followed that St. Catharine's Milling Company had
neither legal lease nor any right to take timber on Crown lands that had been
passed to Ontario at confederation. 70
Canadian Indians had no right to their land other than what the Crown
permitted. At stake was more than ownership, control and development of
millions of acres of Crown land. The whole structure of Canadian federalism
was in the process of development. Ontario, leading the provinces, took the view
that they were full partners in the federal system, a model involving a relatively
weak central government. The Dominion government argued for a model with a
much stronger central government and much weaker provincial governments.17'
The briefs of both sides, as argued in the Supreme Court of Canada, survive
together with a printed appendix of the primary historical documents cited. 72
While there is no complete record of the arguments in the two Ontario courts
which preceded, the Supreme Court case doubtlessly represents a polished
version of Ontario's original arguments. Apparently, the Dominion's case was
not firmly established until the Supreme Court argument. Having lost in the
Ontario courts, the Dominion had considerably more incentive to rethink its
case. The case moved with great rapidity through the courts. It was argued first
in Chancery Division in June, 1885; subsequently in the Ontario Court of Appeal
in December, 1885; and finally in the Supreme Court of Canada in November of
169 Morris, supra note 28 at 44-76.
170 S.B. Cottam, "Indian Title as a 'Celestial Institution' ", supra note II at 247-48. Here, besides
acknowledging that I base my historical analysis of St. Catharine's Milling on Barry Cottam's
work, I gratefully acknowledge that he read this manuscript, made a number of helpful
suggestions on St. Catharine's Milling (and other issues throughout this article) and pointed out
errors in my analysis. I, of course, am responsible for the errors that remain.
171 B. Hodgins, "Disagreement at Commencement: Divergent Ontarian Views of Federalism,
1867-1871" in D. Swainson, ed., Oliver Mowat's Ontario (Toronto: MacMillan of Canada,
1972) 52; and C. Miller, "Mowat, Laurier and the Federal Liberal Party, 1887-1897" in
Swainson, ed., ibid. at 69.
172 The original case file is held in the Canadian National Archives, RG 125, vol. 58, file 648,
parts I and 2.
1992
Saskatchewan Law Review
1886. The respective briefs in the Supreme Court are essentially evolutions of
the original arguments.
Ontario had a powerful advantage in bringing the case in its own courts. The
case was tried in the Chancery Division, before Ontario's own judge, Chancellor
John Alexander Boyd. His decision and its underlying reasoning was
substantially upheld (with some significant limitations) all the way to the Privy
Council. Chancellor Boyd had been President of the Chancery Division of the
High Court of Ontario for four years at the time he heard St. Catharine's Milling.
Prior to that, he had spent twenty-two years as a partner in Edward Blake, one of
Toronto's elite law firms. Blake, who was a leading liberal politician and
member of one of Ontario's most distinguished families, ultimately argued the
St. Catharine's case before the Privy Council. 173 Boyd was well schooled in the
technical intricacies of the law and was a conservative jurist who could be
depended on to write well-crafted opinions. He appeared to have had no
knowledge of either Indians or Indian law prior to the case, although he was
evidently familiar with the Indians in the vicinity of his summer house north of
Toronto. 74 Indeed, the title to his house on Georgian Bay may have been
clouded by the same Indian title problems as St. Catharine's Milling Company's
timber tract, giving Boyd a direct interest in the outcome of the case. 75
Clearly showing this was no ordinary case, Oliver Mowat, Premier and
Attorney General of Ontario from 1872-1896 and the dominant political leader
in the Province during that entire period, personally appeared as one of the
province's lawyers.t76
The Ontario argument was essentially the work of David Mills, a rural Ontario
lawyer, judge, Member of Parliament and cabinet minister. Ironically, Mills was
something of a progressive on matters of Indian rights in land at the time of St.
Catharine's Milling. He was in charge of Indian affairs during his term as
Minister of the Interior in the 1876-78 Liberal government of Alexander
MacKenzie. He had paid particular attention to the condition of Indians in
British Columbia since the Province did not recognize Indian title and was
rapidly alienating Indian land. 7 7 Mills thought that Indians had some "right or
173 J.D. Blackwell, "William Hume Blake and the Judicature Acts of 1849: The Process of Legal
Reform at Mid-Century in Upper Canada" in Flaherty, ed., supra note 14, vol. 1 at 132.
174 "Aboriginal Rights a Century Ago", supra note 11 at 8-9.
175 1 am indebted to Professor Peter Barton, a distant relative of Boyd, for this information in a
private communication of 22 January 1993.
176 A.M. Evans, "Oliver Mowat: Nineteenth-Century Ontario Liberal" in Swainson, ed., supra note
171, 34. Mowat's role in the argument was symbolic, asserting the political importance of the
case.
177 British Columbian Indian land title has a legal history distinctly different from that of Ontario,
stemming from that province's distinct colonial status. Aboriginal Peoples and Politics, supra
note 21.
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title" to their lands that had to be legally extinguished before white settlement
could begin.178 In 1881, Mills asserted in Parliament:
[both] the British Parliament and the American Supreme Court "have
always recognized a title in the Indians-not a political sovereignty over
the country, but a personal right of property in the soil. That title in all
other British colonies had been always considered as existing before the
Crown undertook to deal with the lands for the purpose of sale or disposal
to other parties."179
As a staunch provincial rightist in Parliament, Mills came to represent
Ontario's interests in expanding to the northwest, and his position on Indian title
shifted. Although accused of denying that government acknowledgement of
Indian land title meant the land actually belonged to the Indians, he argued this
recognition of title was a mere political expediency designed to protect good
relations with Indians.180 This conception of Indian title was central to the
Ontario argument.
The main thrust of the Ontario argument was far removed from the legal and
historical nature of Indian title. Ontario's argument focused on the intent of the
British North America Act, arguing the phrase "Indian lands" meant only
reserves, and not all the unoccupied land in Canada. Most judicial efforts and
most of the reported pages in the opinions dealt with this issue of interpretation.
The legal and historical nature of Indian title, however, was a critical element
of the Ontario case, playing a complex role in its structure. In some ways, the
argument about the nature of "Indian title" was little more than the fodder of an
exercise in judicial formalism, at times hardly even relevant to the case in the
minds of the judges. In this context, it is a misnomer to refer to the case by its
popular name, the "Indian title" case: Indian titles were not really at issue,
except to the extent that some provincial or Dominion legal right might stem
from that title. Yet, even if Indian title was fodder, it was a special kind of
fodder, for it brought into the common law the full range of nineteenth century
ideas concerning Indian land ownership. Building on this context and the judicial
maxim that one cannot separate the holding in a case from its facts, St.
Catharine's Milling arguably turns on issues other than Indian title; thus, it is
inappropriate as a judicial precedent for Indian title questions. A detailed look at
the four opinions and the arguments of both sides in the Supreme Court will put
the Indian title argument in the context of the rest of the case.
178 S.B. Cottam, "Indian Title as a 'Celestial Institution': David Mills and the St. Catharine's
Milling Case" in Abel & Friesen, eds., supra note 11 at 250-52.
179 Ibid. at 252.
180 Ibid. at 253. For a summary of different common law legal approaches to aboriginal title see B.
Slattery, Ancestral Lands, Alien Laws: Judicial Perspectives on Aboriginal Title (Saskatoon:
University of Saskatchewan Native Law Centre, 1983).
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At trial in Chancery Division, Premier Oliver Mowat's argument centered on
Indian title, asserting that Ontario Indians had only a moral claim to the land, a
claim not recognized in law.'81 He cited two Ontario cases, Bown v. West and
Church v. Fenton; the American case, Johnson v. M'Intosh; and the American
commentator Chancellor Kent in support of this proposition.82 According to
Mowat's view, the numerous Ontario land surrenders, which had involved very
complex and direct negotiations between the Crown and the various tribes in
Ontario, were dismissed as "only out of endeavor to satisfy the Indians." Mowat
denied that any property right underlay the policy.' 83 To underscore this point,
Mowat argued that British Columbia had never recognized any Indian land title,
implicitly denying that Ontario had an entirely different legal and political
history. 184
Attorney D'Alton McCarthy, Jr. appeared for St. Catharine's Milling
Company, was paid by the Dominion government, and argued the case for the
Dominion's claim to the land. He relied more extensively on American cases,
which supported both the proposition that the Indians had some form of title, and
that Indian matters in a federal system fell to the national government. This
federal power was broad, not simply the narrow authority over small reserves
that Ontario would have recognized. While McCarthy cited The Cherokee
Nation v. Georgia, Worcester v. Georgia (collectively referred to as the
"Cherokee cases") and a number of other American cases and commentators, he
failed to refer to their context, which involved a complex and parallel dispute
between the states and the national government over both the alienation of
Indian lands and the political control of Indian affairs. 185
Chancellor Boyd's opinion was addressed to the issues raised by Mowat. He
began by noting that lands in Canada had been vested in the Crown by conquest,
181 R. v. St. Catharine's Milling and Lumber Co. (1886), 10 O.R. 196 at 199-201. The case was
argued during the Northwest Uprising of 1885, a Mrtis uprising over land rights and other
grievances. Obviously, this context might tend to undermine any idea that the Indians had
extensive legal rights. See Smith, supra note 11 at 9-10.
182 Ibid. at 199; Johnston v. M'lntosh 8 Wheat. 543 (1824); J. Kent, Commentaries on American
Law, vol. 1, ed. by OW. Holmes, (Boston: Little, Brown, 1896) at 258.
183 St. Catharine's Milling, ibid. at 200.
184 St. Catharine's Milling, ibid. at 200. British Columbia Sessional Papers, 1876 "Papers
Connected with the Indian Land Question" (Victoria: Queen's Printer for British Columbia,
1987) (Originally printed in 1875). British Columbia's rejection of any Indian land title is
specifically enshrined in Canadian law in paragraph 13 of its confederation agreement.
185 St. Catharine's Milling, ibid. at 202. 5 Peter 1 (1831); 6 Peter 515 (1832); J.C. Burke, "The
Cherokee Cases: A Study in Law, Politics and Morality" (1968-69) 21 Stan. L. Rev. 500; and
G.E. White, History of the Supreme Court of the United States: The Marshall Court and
Cultural Change, 1815-1835 (New York: MacMillan, 1988) especially c. 10: "Natural Law and
Racial Minorities: The Court's Response to Slaves and Indians" at 674. There are dozens of
studies of the full context of the "Cherokee cases." See e.g., W.G. McLoughlin, Cherokees and
Missionaries, 1789-1839 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1984); and W.G. McLoughlin,
Cherokee Renaissance in the New Republic (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986).
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and that public lands in Ontario had been transferred from the Crown to the
Province in 1837 by statute. 8 6 Boyd then turned to the Indian title issues, the
bases of Ontario's claim. Characterizing the Indians as "heathens and
barbarians," Boyd denied that any "legal ownership of the land was ever
attributed to them", citing a 1675 New York opinion of a "multitude of
counsellors."' 187 Boyd then cited Johnson v. M'lntosh in support of the
proposition that Indians did not have legal ownership of the land.8 Given both
the complexity and the weight of the historical evidence, Boyd's reasoning and
use of precedent for the proposition that Indians had no title in their
unsurrendered lands is simply wrong. Moreover, his reference to Chief Justice
John Marshall in Johnson v. M'Intosh is misleading. While Marshall's opinion
does subscribe to a conquest-based theory of the extinguishment of Indian title,
the case clearly held that the Indians have a substantial property right in their
lands that could only be surrendered to the government of the United States and
not to private parties. This construction would have supported the St. Catharine's
Milling Company's view of the case. 189 Boyd, presumably deliberately and
disingenuously, ignored Chief Justice Marshall's opinions in the Cherokee cases,
precedents that would have been enormously damaging to his view of Indians as
"barbarians" without legal rights to their lands. Indeed, Marshall's holding that
the Cherokees were "domestic, dependent nations" with a substantial amount of
political sovereignty and a legal right to their lands is considered foundational
for United States Indian law, but simply was not dealt with by nineteenth century
Canadian courts. Even today, while the concept of tribal sovereignty is at the
core of United States Indian law, Canadian courts have either denied or evaded
the issue.
Boyd then analyzed Canadian Indian policy. He referred to a "benevolent
policy" for the "liberal treatment of Indians" (whom he also referred to as "rude
red-men"), and recited a short history of British paternalism, which was
designed to open up the frontier to whites while protecting the Indians and
avoiding a "collision" between the two groups. 190 Although the Indians were
regularly given various "guarantees" to protect their "territories," only reserves
186 St. Catharine's Milling, ibid. at 205. Act. 7 Will. IV, c. 118.
187 St. Catharine's Milling, ibid. at 206-208. Documents Relating to the Colonial History of the
State of New York, vol. xiii, 486. The opinion itself was reprinted in Boyd's judgment,
occupying more than two pages of fine print.
188 St. Catharine's Milling, ibid. at 209. 8 Wheat. 595 (1823).
189 R.A. Williams, The American Indian in Western Legal Thought: The Discourses of Conquest
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1990) at 233-86. Part III: "The Norman Yoke" offers a
detailed analysis of the late seventeenth and early eighteenth century jurisprudence of Indian
land rights.
190 These racist views of Indians were common to Canadians of the day. For an analysis of the
Canadian Indian in nineteenth century Canadian social thought, see B.G. Trigger, Natives and
Newcomers: Canada's "Heroic Age" Reconsidered (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University
Press, 1985) c. 1: "The Indian Image in Canadian History" at 3-49.
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formally surrendered by treaty were "reserves" held for the Indians by the
Crown. In Boyd's analysis, these reserves were the "Indian lands" placed under
Dominion control by the British North America Act. All other lands were Crown
lands belonging to Ontario.191
The Ontario Court of Appeal concentrated on the allocation of powers
between the Dominion and provincial governments, rather than the issue of
Indian title. The opinion of Chief Justice Hagarty, upholding Ontario's claim to
the land in dispute, turned on his interpretation of the intent of the BNA Act, not
on his view of Indian title. In fact, Hagarty admitted the question of Indian title
was difficult, rejecting Boyd's view. Hagarty believed the 1873 North-West
Angle Treaty extinguished Indian claims, a view that necessarily admits the
Indians still held some form of property right until the treaty.192
Judge Burton's separate opinion was much more consistent with Boyd's
analysis. Burton stated that the contention that the Indians had title to the land
was a "startling one"' 193 never argued in a British Court of Justice before, and he
dismissed the American cases without referring to their arguments with any
particularity.194 While generally endorsing the views of Boyd, Burton went
beyond the chancellor and took a strong position defending the prerogatives of
the Province. He claimed the Province had control over the Indians and the
delegates of the provinces who negotiated the confederation agreement would
never have yielded control over the vast lands of Canada to the Dominion.195
Based on Boyd's construction of the British North America Act, Judge
Patterson concurred with Burton's claim, but neither Patterson nor Hagarty
agreed with Boyd on the question of Indian title. Patterson recognized that the
relationship between the Indians and Europeans was "peculiar" and that the
Indians had some type of sovereignty over the land which included some right to
sell or transfer it.196 Judge Osler, without writing a separate opinion, agreed with
Judge Hagarty.
While Chancellor Boyd's opinion largely turned on the nature of Indian title,
the opinion of the Ontario Court of Appeal primarily relied on the Court's
interpretation of the intent of the British North America Act. Although Burton
used demeaning and racist language similar to Boyd's in characterizing Indians,
the two judges believed that the Indians had a more substantial right to their
lands, and did not base their judgments on a complete denial of Indian title.
The Supreme Court of Canada missed its opportunity to write a masterful
opinion definitively setting out the rights of Indians. This is not surprising given
191 St. Catharine's Milling, supra note 181 at 218-20.
192 (1886), 13 O.A.R. 148 at 154 and 156-57.
193 Ibid. at 159.
194 Ibid. at 160-61.
195 Ibid. at 163-64.
196 Ibid at 169
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the troubled history of the Court. Created in 1875, the Court had not yet
established a clear role for itself between powerful provincial appellate courts
and a final appeal to the Privy Council. St. Catharine's Milling was the first
important case decided by the court. The court had so little prestige that it was
difficult to appoint qualified judges. 197
An outline of the respective cases made by Ontario and by St. Catharine's
Milling Company (directly representing the interests of the Dominion
government) can be gleaned both from their briefs and from the brief summary
printed in the reported opinion. Both briefs are tedious documents, heavily laden
with technical formalities rather than good legal argument. The brief for Ontario
is surprisingly weak, given what was at stake and the eminence of the lawyers
who produced it. Signed by Oliver Mowat and E.F.B. Johnson, the brief runs
barely fourteen pages, half of which is composed of rote strings of citations.
Essentially, it is little more than a bald-faced assertion of Ontario's view of the
dispute, with no real argument of the complexities of Indian rights raised by St.
Catharine's attorneys. 198
The appellants' brief is much more complete, reflecting the complexity of St.
Catharine's view of Indian title. 199 The work is quite scholarly and detailed,
running seventy-nine pages.200 The major thrust of the argument is that Indians'
rights to their lands had always been recognized in North America in a variety of
different ways. The brief also contains well-edited excerpts from dozens of
treaties and cases-largely American-showing precisely the nature and extent
of Indian title.20' However, the appellants failed to put forward any theory of
Indian title. Rather, their position inherited all of the ambiguity of previous
cases, even those that had recognized some Indian property right: the appellants
failed to indicate the precise nature of that right. How would an upholding of
that right and a decision for St. Catharine's Milling affect Indian title and
Dominion/provincial relations in Canada?
197 The Supreme Court of Canada did not fully emerge as an important appellate court until after
1949 when it became Canada's highest court of appeal, replacing the Privy Council. Before that
it was a weak institution. D.H. Flaherty, "Writing Canadian Legal History: An Introduction" in
Flaherty, ed., supra note 14, vol. 1 at 10. A complete history of the Court is found in J.G. Snell
& F. Vaughan, The Supreme Court of Canada: History of The Institution (Toronto: University
of Toronto Press, 1985).
198 "Respondents' Factum," printed copy in RG 125, vol. 58, file 642, part 1.
199 The Dominion government for political reasons chose to use the St. Catharine's Milling
Company as its proxy in the case, directly paying its lawyers, who argued the Dominion's case.
While it is commonly assumed that St. Catharine's Milling simply represented the Dominion's
position, this was denied by both parties, especially after St. Catharine's lost and the Dominion
government wanted to distance themselves from a losing case. See An Historical Background
of the St. Catharine's Milling and Lumber Company Case, supra note 11 at 59-61 and 70-75.




Part of the answer to this failure may lie in a discussion of a major body of
American sources not cited in the factum. By 1886, there was a substantial body
of American jurisprudence on tribal rights, including approximately twenty
United States Supreme Court cases and several hundred lower federal and state
court cases. The main thrust of these cases recognized significant Indian rights,
including land rights and political sovereignty. They also reflected an extensive
conflict between the states and the federal government over control of Indian
lands, and Indians on their lands, a conflict the states had lost by the 1880s. 202
Given the great extent of the research cited in St. Catharine's brief, including
references to very obscure American documents, it is clear that St. Catharine's
lawyers could have accessed these cases. Their failure to do so is difficult to
explain, especially in light of their substantial reliance on American historical
evidence. One possible explanation is that the concept of tribal sovereignty is
central to American Indian law and neither St. Catharine's Milling Company nor
the Dominion government wanted the issue introduced into Canadian Indian
policy.203 While the interests of the Dominion very much depended on the
Indians having some recognized legal title to their lands, the ultimate aim was to
purchase that title cheaply and to settle Indian lands under Dominion, rather than
Provincial control. Thus, companies like St. Catharine's Milling would pay their
royalties to and take their titles from the national government. The Dominion
was not defending the legal and political interests of Native people. Any legal
talk of tribal sovereignty was not in the interests of either party.
Beyond the sovereignty implications, American cases were technically and
mechanically used ineffectively by all parties in St. Catharine's Milling at every
level. The lawyers involved in the case were among the best lawyers in Canada
so this cannot reflect their legal abilities. Rather, it must reflect their analytical
choices. While this may be excusable for the Ontario lawyers who were paid to
represent the Province's political and legal position, it was bad lawyering for St.
Catharine's lawyers. Their brief was a model of ineffective legal writing: it was
a mere list of more than one hundred citations for the proposition that American
colonies recognized some Indian title to their land.204 Moreover, this evidence
was primarily in the form of colonial treaties and land grants, not nineteenth
century cases that might have been more persuasive as legal precedent. Dozens
of American state court cases had discussed the question of Indian rights in
general, and Indian title in particular, dealing directly with Ontario's view of
202 S.L. Harring, Crow Dog's Case: Indian Sovereignty in Nineteenth Century American Law
(New York: Cambridge University Press, 1993).
203 Bruce Clark argues that Native sovereignty has survived in Canadian law, although it has not
been recognized by the Canadian courts. See his Native Liberty, Crown Sovereignty: The
Existing Aboriginal Right of Self-Government in Canada (Montreal: McGill-Queen's
University Press, 1990).
204 See "Appellants' Factum" and "Joint Appendix," Canadian National Archives, RG 125, vol.
58, file 642, part 1.
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Indian title.205 By and large, all of these views had been rejected in the United
States, either by the state courts themselves, or following the "Cherokee cases,"
by federal courts. The federal courts rejected state claims to Indian lands based
on theories of inferential Indian rights in a federal system which were
comparable to the Dominion's claim to jurisdiction over Indian lands. The
"Cherokee cases" involved an expansive Georgia claim to Cherokee lands based
on Georgia's views of its state sovereignty over lands within its borders.206 In the
early 1830s, Georgia and the neighbouring states of Alabama and Tennessee had
made detailed and sophisticated arguments about the nature of the state's
extinguishment of Indian title that were rejected by American law.207 While there
are obviously differences between the claims of Georgia and Ontario (for
example, the intent of the BNA Act in allocating "Crown" lands), evidence of
these differences was not organized by St. Catharine's Milling Company lawyers
into a coherent legal argument.
The worst offenders were the respective judges who refused to recognize any
Native right to their land, citing American cases to support that proposition.
Their misuse of precedent is so dishonest that it appears that St. Catharine's
Milling would have lost no matter how well they had argued. Of all the judges,
the legal reasoning of Chancellor Boyd was the most disingenuous. He reduced
(and misstated) Chief Justice John Marshall's lengthy and complex views on
Indian title to "concisely stat[ing] the same law of the mother-country" that "[a]ll
our institutions recognize the absolute title of the Crown, subject only to the
Indian right of occupancy, and recognize the absolute title of the Crown to
extinguish that right." 208 Marshall took a much more complex view of Indian
title in Johnson v. M'Intosh than had been taken in the "Cherokee cases." On
appeal, Judge Burton cited Fletcher v. Peck for the proposition that United
States law did not support any idea of Indian title. Rather, United States law only
recognized an occupancy right. Judge Burton completely ignored the "Cherokee
cases," as well as the subsequent evolution of Indian rights in American law
which clearly superseded Fletcher v. Peck as a statement of Indian property
rights.20 9 Chief Justice Sir William Ritchie of the Supreme Court used the same
method, taking a quotation from Justice Joseph Story's treatise on the United
205 Crow Dog's Case, supra note 202, c. 2: "Corn Tassel: State and Federal Conflict over Tribal
Sovereignty".
206 The literature on the Cherokees' legal conflict with Georgia is voluminous. Supra note 185.
207 C.P. Magrath, Yazoo, Law and Politics in the New Republic: The Case of Fletcher v. Peck
(Providence: Brown University Press, 1966). State v. George Tassells, I Dud. 229 (1830);
Caldwell v. State, 6 Peter 327 (1832); State v. Foreman, 8 Yerg. 256 (1835). Caldwell runs 118
pages, while Foreman is only a few pages less, making these the most elaborate judicial
statements of Indian law in the United States.
208 Supra note 181 at 209, citing Johnson v. M'intosh.
209 Supra note 192 at 159, citing Fletcher v. Peck.
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States Constitution completely out of context and misstating its meaning.20 The
opinions of Ritchie and Burton took statements out of context, never looking to a
full interpretation of the evolution, either of John Marshall's decisions or of
American law through the early 1880s. The landmark American case, U.S. v.
Kagama,2" decided in early 1886, included the judicial pronouncement of the
"plenary power doctrine" of nearly unlimited governmental power over Indians.
Although this case supported the Ontario position, it was never cited anywhere
in the St. Catharine's proceedings. Perhaps this omission can be explained by
the slowness with which American reporters reached Canada, but more likely
was due to the mechanical quality of research done by the St. Catharine's
lawyers and judges. Only Judges Strong and Gwynne, who dissented, adequately
came to grips with the American cases. Perhaps they were persuaded by their
reading of the cases; however, it is more than likely that they were using the
American cases for their own political ends. Their discussions, particularly
Strong's, reveal a sound understanding of American precedent on the question of
Indian title.212
Although not central to either party's case, a 279 page "Joint Appendix" was
prepared and printed on the order of Justice Fournier about six weeks before the
case was heard.213 About fifty of these pages dealt with the American colonies,
with the remainder exhaustively covering British relations with Indians in the
various Canadian provinces. This meticulously crafted document, which
210 J. Story, Story on the Constitution, 4th ed. ss. 687: "The crown has the right to grant the soil
while yet in possession of the Indians, subject, however, to their right of occupancy." Story,
who had written a separate opinion in Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, believed that the Indian
Nations were sovereign nations and that their right, while one of "occupancy," was a
substantial property right that could only be extinguished by a nation to nation treaty process.
211 118 U.S. 375 (1886). Kagama was decided in April of 1886. St. Catharine's Milling was
argued in the Supreme Court of Canada in late November of 1886, with a final day of argument
in June of 1887. It would have certainly been reported by the second argument. Kagama and
the plenary power doctrine it establishes was the basis for the United States' own St.
Catharine's Milling: Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553 (1903) which holds that whatever
the Indians property right in their lands, it could be denied at the will of Congress, with no right
of compensation to the tribes. This position, however, did not need to deny tribal property
rights in their lands. Rather, it turned on the political nature of the federal government's power
over Indians; thus, although it achieves the same result as St. Catharine's Milling, it is based on
an entirely distinct legal theory. N.J. Newton, "Federal Power Over Indians: Its Sources, Scope
and Limitations" (1984) 132 Univ. of Pennsylvania L. Rev. 195.
212 (1887), 13 S.C.R. 577 at 602-38 and 650-76. It should be noted that Strong and Gwynne wrote
the longest of the various opinions. Together they wrote 62 pages of the 99 page opinion, while
the other five judges wrote only 37 pages between them. Ironically, the two Ontario judges on
the Court were the dissenters, raising an issue whether their opinions were political as both
were appointed by a federal Conservative government which was attempting to extend
dominion power against a Liberal Ontario provincial government that was seeking to limit
dominion power.
213 "Joint Appendix," RG 125, vol. 58, file 648, part 1. The order of Justice Fournier is printed at
277.
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contained all of the historical references made by both parties, put the nature of
Indian title in Canadian history directly at issue.
Chief Justice Sir William Ritchie's opinion immediately addressed the issue of
land title. He held that the Indians had a right of occupancy, and the Crown had a
legal title in the land-a decision following the Ontario position and denying an
Indian property right in the land.214 The decision was a great victory for Ontario,
effectively making Ontario's Indian law every bit as national as Ontario's Indian
policy had become. Chief Justice Ritchie's three page opinion ended on exactly
that note, acknowledging that the case had been so "fully and ably dealt with by
the learned Chancellor.. .I feel I can add nothing to what has been said by
him."215
Justice Samuel Strong carefully analyzed the nature of Indian title in a thirty-
six page opinion, relying heavily on American cases. 216 He construed the
question narrowly: whether "lands reserved for Indians" in the BNA Act included
the lands surrendered by the Ojibwa in Treaty Number Three.217 He surveyed
different types of traditional land tenure arrangements and found that all had one
common element: lands held traditionally were "lands reserved for the Indians",
with the Indians having definite property rights. Heavily influenced by American
law, Strong found an unwritten common law that "these territorial rights of the
Indians were strictly legal rights" which had to be taken into account in the
distribution of property between the Dominion and the provinces upon
confederation.18 Following American precedent, Strong held that Indian lands
were not the property of the Crown and had not passed to Ontario.19
In a lengthy opinion, Justice John Gwynne agreed with Strong. 220 Justices
William Henry, Telesphore Fournier and Henri-Elzear Taschereau agreed with
Ritchie in short opinions. Henry again complemented Boyd's work, saying he
"entirely approved" of Boyd's opinion.221 Fournier, who had ordered the printing
of the Appendix, simply concurred with Ritchie without writing a separate
opinion.22 Ontario had won 4-2 in the Supreme Court.
214 St. Catharine's Milling: Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, supra note 211 at 599. Ritchie had formerly
been Chief Justice of New Brunswick and had never written an opinion on Native rights. The
land rights of Indians in the Maritime Provinces were as unclear as they were in Ontario, and
the tribes there had been largely stripped of their lands. See Micmacs and Colonists: Indian-
White Relations in the Maritimes, 1713-1867, supra note 21.
215 St. Catharine's Milling, supra note 212 at 601.
216 Ibid. at 608-13. The reliance on American precedent was common in nineteenth century
Canadian law. G.B. Baker, "The Reconstruction of Upper Canadian Legal Thought in the Late-
Victorian Empire" (1985) 3 Law and Hist. Rev. 219 at 236-39 and 252-54.
217 Ibid. at 603; British North America Act, ss. 91, 24.
218 Ibid. at 613.
219 Ibid. at 638.
220 Ibid. at 650-76.
221 Ibid. at 639.
222 Ibid. at 638.
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By now, the issues had been argued and the judges had written opinions on
both sides. The appeal to the Privy Council was perfunctory. The court focused
more on the intention of the BNA Act than on Indian title.223 Once again, Ontario
won I and the legal views of Chancellor Boyd were substantially vindicated.
Indians in Ontario-and Canada-had only a right of occupancy, not ownership
of (heir lands. This usufructuary right was a significant right and amounted to a
greater Native interest in their traditional lands than Ontario had supported.
Nonetheless, undeveloped lands within provincial boundaries belonged to the
provinces, not the national government.
Several important cases followed in the wake of St. Catharine's Milling, but
they add little doctrinally. Rather, these cases continue Ontario's aggressive
policy of asserting provincial claims over Indian lands. Neither the interests of
the Indians nor the Dominion government did very well. In Attorney General of
Ontario v. Francis, another Dominion timber lease was at issue, again in the far
Northwest of Ontario.24 These lands, however, had been made part of an Indian
reserve in the Robinson-Huron Treaty of 1850.225 The Canadian government had
the lands surveyed in 1884. In July 1886, the timber was sold for the benefit of
the Indians, with the money to be held in trust. 226 However, Ontario had also sold
the same timber in 1872. The Ontario timber leases were "widely advertised" but
the Dominion government neither objected nor made any claim that an Indian
reserve was contained on the lands. 227
As if this confusion and ineptness of both governments in managing Indian
lands was not sufficient, a heavy measure of arrogance and a continuation of the
dispute over basic issues of federalism also emerged. When the Dominion
government learned by accident of the Ontario sale, Mr. Vankoughnet, a veteran
official of the Indian Department, travelled from Ottawa to Toronto expressly to
resolve the matter. At the end of his interview with Ontario's Deputy
Commissioner of Crown Lands, he was left with the impression that Ontario
would "settle with the purchasers of its licences." The Indian Department
proceeded with the sale of the federal licences. Ontario, however, did not do so,
pitting two sets of licencees against each other, with the Attorney General of
Ontario suing in Chancery to eject the federal licencees.228
The Dominion government had no evidence of the existence of an Indian
reserve of its own creation, a sad commentary on the state of its administration
223 (1889), 14 A.C. 46.
224 Supra note 18. This case was not reported until found in the Ontario Provincial Archives in
1980.
225 The Treaties of Canada, supra note 28 at 16-21.
226 Supra note 18 at 10.
227 Ibid. at 11.
228 Ibid. at 12-13. Vankoughnet's long career with the Indian Department is analyzed in D.
Leighton, "A Victorian Civil Servant at Work: Lawrence Vankoughnet and the Canadian
Indian Department, 1874-1893" in Getty & Lussier, eds., supra note 36 at 104.
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of Indian affairs. The Dominion called Mongowin, chief of the Ojibwa band that
lived on the reserve at issue as a witness. Mongowin had intimate knowledge of
his heritage and testified that his father, Shewanakishick, had called a council at
Whitefish Lake to ask the band if he should agree to the reserve granted in the
treaty. Mongowin also testified to the boundaries of the reserve described at that
council: "following the road" around the reserve beginning with
Nebenenekahming, place of the high cranberries, and after describing nine
places, ending with Muckohdehwaugohming, Black Lake. 229 Several other
Indian witnesses testified as well. Based on this testimony, the Court found the
reserve existed. What remained was to set its boundaries. This was a simple
matter as the Ojibwa description closely matched the recent Dominion survey. 230
Ontario argued that surrendered Indian lands reverted to the Province under
the BNA Act, no longer being "Indian lands or lands reserved for Indians." Judge
Ferguson quickly rejected this argument, holding the Dominion's sale of timber
was a simple act of administration done for the benefit of the band. 23'
Traditionally, Indian lands had been sold or leased "for the benefit of the
Indians." Ontario's argument attempted to deny that practice would have had the
effect of shifting much Indian land-and assets-to provincial administration.
Because the lands in question were "Indian lands," the Dominion prevailed. The
opinion was handed down within a month of the Privy Council's decision in St.
Catharine's Milling. The Court specifically withheld their decision pending a
decision of the Privy Council, but later found that that decision had no bearing
on the case: "lands reserved for Indians" were under Dominion jurisdiction
under the BNA Act.232
However, Ontario was not yet finished with its expansive claims to lands
reserved for Indians prior to confederation. The province sought control over its
lands and resources in a way that simply ignored Native rights. The Ontario
Mining Company v. Seybold involved another Indian reserve, again in
Northwestern Ontario.233 The case was decided by Chancellor Boyd and
contained many elements of his original St. Catharine's Milling opinion. At
stake was provincial title to another tract of Indian lands that the Dominion
secured through Treaty Three, the same 1873 process that ultimately was the
foundation for the Dominion's claim on the lands disputed in St. Catharine's
Milling. In negotiating Treaty Three, the Dominion granted the Indians a number
of reserves, including Sultana Island in Lake of the Woods. In 1886, however,
229 Ibid. at 14-15.
230 Ibid. at 17-18.
231 Ibid. at 21-22.
232 Ibid. at 22-25. In the same year, the New Brunswick Supreme Court handed down an opinion
holding that title to Indian reserves, following St. Catharine's Milling, lay in the Province and
not in the Dominion. Doe Dem. Burk v. Cormier (1890), 30 N.B.R. 142.
233 (1899), 31 O.R. 386.
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the Ojibwa Indians had surrendered Sultana Island to the Dominion to sell "for
the benefit of the Indians" and to hold the monies received in trust. The
Dominion sold the land, which was rich in minerals, to the Ontario Mining
Company. The Province of Ontario, following the Privy Council decision in St.
Catharine's Milling, disputed this title, arguing that since the Dominion did not
have title to Treaty Three lands, it could not transfer any title to Ontario Mining
Company.234
While some legal elements of this case were similar to those in St. Catharine's
Milling, the issue was not just land title. Ontario conceded Dominion authority
over Indian affairs, but the capacity of the Dominion government to conduct
Indian affairs in the West was weakened because the Dominion lacked the
capacity to grant reserves to the Indians. Rather, the process required the consent
of the provinces, who could protect local interests, ensuring that Indians received
only the most worthless and remote lands.
Chancellor Boyd was unwilling to go that far, but his ruling did curtail
Dominion powers over Indian lands. Boyd conceded that the Dominion had a
right to grant a reserve to the Indians, and a right to sell those lands and hold
money in trust for the Indians. These powers were limited by their purpose: if
that land or money was not used to benefit Indians it reverted to the Province, for
it was the Province that ultimately held title to the land. 235 Mineral rights were
not included in the sale of lands since the Indians had no interest in minerals.
Ownership of those minerals remained with the Crown and was passed to
Ontario at Confederation.236 On appeal to a Divisional Court, Boyd's judgment
was upheld in a three page opinion, once again complementing Chancellor
Boyd's reasoning.237 The Supreme Court of Canada again upheld Boyd's ruling,
an action that increased the wealth of the provinces at the expense of both the
Indians and the Dominion.238 Like St. Catharine's Milling, the case went to the
Privy Council, where the Dominion once again lost.239 The Dominion
government was forced to negotiate an agreement with Ontario to gain access to
any land for purposes of Indian reserves. 240 Without the consent of Ontario,
234 Ibid. at 387-88. It appears that the Dominion, in the 1870s, did not think that it acquired title to
these lands through Indian title. Rather, it took that argument from Ontario's claim, first raised
in St. Catharine's Milling, that the opposite was the case.
235 Ibid. at 397-98.
236 Ibid. at 400.
237 (1900), 32 O.R. 301.
238 (1903), 32 S.C.R. 1.
239 (1902), 3 C.N.L.C. 203 (P.C.); Indian Reserves and Aboriginal Lands in Canada, supra note
29 at 66-67.
240 An 1894 agreement between Ontario and the Dominion, providing for a Joint Commission to
settle all land disputes pertaining to Indian reserve lands "in order to avoid dissatisfaction or
discontent among the Indians" attempted to resolve this jurisdictional problem, but the issue is
still problematic: see The Province of Ontario v. The Dominion of Canada and the Province of
Quebec (1896), 25 S.C.R. 434. For Ontario's view of the effect of this agreement, see
Memorandum: "Re The Indian Question" Office of the Attorney General of Ontario, March 21,
1910, RG 4, series 4-32, (1910) file 587.
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Indians had no right to the land on which their shacks and homes were situated.
The process of adjudication in these cases left all sides dissatisfied and
contributed to the feeling among government officials that courts should be kept
out of Indian policy. The message was clear: the provinces and the Dominion
needed to negotiate these jurisdictional differences and should not rely on
litigation. This spirit was reflected in a letter from the Ontario Secretary of the
Treasury to Prime Minister Wilfrid Laurier, written while Ontario Mining was
being litigated:
Every now and again questions are arising where doubts as to
jurisdiction exist, and it seems to me that instead of depending upon the
slow, inconvenient and expensive process of leaving the determination to
the courts,...much might be accomplished by an effort to arrive at an
understanding as to what jurisdiction should be... 241
It is no accident that few major Indian cases were decided by Canadian courts
until the 1960s.242 Substantial issues of Native rights existed, but courts deferred
Indian legal rights to political policy-makers, depriving Native people of their
legal rights in Canadian society and access to the courts as an institution to
defend Native rights.
III. CANADIAN CRIMINAL LAW AND THE GRAND
RIVER IROQUOIS: CANADIAN LAW AND INDIAN LIFE
The reported cases provide a good insight into nineteenth century Ontario
jurisprudence and an understanding of the formal legal thought governing
Indian/white relations. These cases are necessarily highly selective, representing
only those in which either or both parties had the will and the resources to appeal
a trial court judgment. Given the poverty of nineteenth century Ontario Indians
and the lack of any form of legal aid, only in those few cases where the Indian
Department felt some duty (or policy imperative) to hire a lawyer to represent an
Indian in local courts were cases appealed and reported. Yet, the evidence is
clear that one kind of law to which Indians did not lack access was Canadian
criminal law: thousands of criminal cases were brought against Ontario Indians
in the nineteenth century.
241 Letter of Ontario Secretary of the Treasury to Wilfrid Laurier, re: Georgian Bay Islands, RG 3,
Series 03-01-0-20 (26 February 1900).
242 It is probably the range of legal disputes over tribal hunting and fishing rights that brought
Indian rights back to the courts. See the cases discussed, supra section IF. The major issues of
Indian title did not return to the court until the 1970s in Calder et al. v. Attorney-General of
British Columbia (1973), 34 D.L.R. (3d) 145. W.H. McConnell, "The Calder Case in Historical
Perspective" (1973-74) 38:1 Sask. L. Rev. 88.
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Indian legal activity in the area of civil law would be a better measure of the
legal integration of Indians into late nineteenth century Ontario because civil law
reflects both the individual choice to use the law as well as the social capacity to
do so. However, civil cases involving Indians are rare, reflecting Indian poverty
and isolation from Ontario society. These cases are also difficult to access
because civil court records do not uniformly record race, and most Southern
Ontario Indians had Christian names. Therefore, appellate civil cases may
provide an idea of the range of issues raised, but not their frequency.
Criminal cases involving Indians measure a different kind of Indian legal
involvement with Ontario society. Generally, criminal cases were not disputes
between Indians initiated by the Indians themselves. These charges were brought
by Canadian officials, either Indian agents or police officers, applying either
general Canadian criminal law or offences under the Indian Act particular to
Indians. The law involved might be called "imposed law" because it was
external to Native society, and was part of an attempt by whites to enforce their
standards of behavior on Indian people. 243
The run of criminal cases from the Grand River Reserve suggests there was a
great deal of legal activity there. The area concentrated three thousand Iroquois
whose people, allies of the British Crown, had moved to Canada from New York
State following the American Revolution. They occupied substantial agricultural
lands in the midst of a settled white population.244 The Brantford Jail Register
carefully recorded a great deal of data for each person lodged there, including a
clear indication of their race, occupation, residence, offence, sentence, number
of previous arrests and the discharge date. The register provides a detailed (but
not complete) listing of the Indians charged with criminal offences.2 45 An
examination of the number and types of criminal charges brought against Indians
will provide some measure of one form of Canadian legal activity involving
Indians.
In the early 1800s, Brant County, of which Brantford was the major city
(population 12,000), was a prosperous agricultural county of 34,000, of which
approximately 3,000 were Iroquois. This, in itself, reflects Canada's betrayal of
243 S.B. Burman & B.E. Harrell-Bond, eds., The Imposition of Law (London: Academic Press,
1979). Thomas Stone refers to this imposition of law as "legal penetration" in his analysis of
the imposition of Canadian law on the St. Regis Reservation in Quebec. See "Legal
Mobilization and Legal Penetration: The Department of Indian Affairs and the Canadian Party
at St. Regis, 1876-1918" (1975) 22 Ethnohistory 375.
244 Mr. Attorney: The Attorney General for Ontario in Court, Cabinet and Legislature, 1791-1899,
infra note 321 at 29-31. The Crown almost immediately refused to recognize any Indian legal
title in this reserve. As early as 1797, six blocks of Iroquois land, ranging from 19,000 to
94,000 acres each, were sold to white speculators by the Indians, the sale being affirmed by the
Crown.
245 Brantford Jail Register, Ontario Provincial Archives, RG 21.
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the Iroquois. Brant County, named after Chief Joseph Brant who was an ally of
the British in the Revolutionary War, had once been Indian lands. A huge
reserve on the Grand River was granted to Brant's people as a reward for their
assistance in the war. Most of the rich Grand River lands were surrendered to
whites. By 1880, the Iroquois lands were largely limited to Tuscarora Township,
which was essentially co-extensive with the current Grand River Reserve. 46 Of
the 2,891 inhabitants of Tuscarora Township, 2,509 were Indian. The Iroquois
lived as small farmers and labourers, essentially isolated in a dispersed rural
Iroquois community five to ten miles from Brantford. They were presided over
by an Indian agent. The Reserve had no villages, but a post office, store and
mission were located as Oswekon, at the reserve. Initially, the Indians kept to
themselves, applying their own traditional law to offences and land tenure, but
Canadian authorities increasingly intervened in tribal matters. 247 A published
account of the operation of Iroquois law on the reserve shows that both tribal law
and Canadian law were in operation in the late nineteenth century.
248
Simply stated, Grand River Indians went to jail in great numbers after 1873
(when jail records are first available). Moreover, there was a clear change in the
racial pattern of jailings. Initially, Indians were jailed at a rate roughly equivalent
to their proportion of the population. However, by the end of the century, Indians
were jailed at a greatly disproportionate rate, as is the situation for Native people
in modem Canada. 249 For example, for the last eight months of 1873 (no records
exist for the first four months) out of 359 lodged in jail, 27 or 7.5% were
Indians.2 50 Indians represented about 9% of the total population. This data
reflects that they were arrested roughly in proportion to their share of the
population. During 1874, Indian arrests amounted to 57 arrests of 519, or about
246 C.P. Mulvaney et al., The History of the County of Brant (Toronto: Warner, Beers, 1883) at 247
and 489-90. See also C.M. Johnston, Brant County: A History, 1784-1945 (Toronto: Oxford
University Press, 1967).
247 J.A. Noon, Law and Government of the Grand River Iroquois (New York: Johnson Reprint,
1971); and W.B. Newell, Crime and Justice Among the Iroquois Nations (Montreal:
Caughnawaga Historical Society, 1965).
248 Law and Government of the Grand River Iroquois, ibid. See especially the appendix titled "A
Case Book of Iroquois Law" at 115.
249 Indians are arrested and jailed in Canada in numbers far greater than their share of the
population. See P. Havemann, Law and Order for Canada's Indigenous People (Regina:
Prairie Justice Research, University of Regina, 1984). This situation is also true for the United
States and Australia. S.L. Harring, "Native American Crime in the United States: Patterns of
Crime, Law Enforcement and Economic Development" in L. French, ed., Indians and Criminal
Justice (Montclair: Allenheld-Osmun, 1983); E. Eggleston, Fear, Favor, or Affection
(Canberra: Australian National University Press, 1976); and K.M. Hazlehurst, Ivory Scales:
Black Australia and the Law (Kensington: New South Wales University Press, 1987).
250 Brantford Jail Register, Ontario Provincial Archives, RG 21. The first volume available records
all those lodged into the jail from April 1873 through the end of 1880. The second volume is
missing. The third volume begins in October of 1899. After that date the data is complete. I
recorded all arrests for 1873, 1874, 1880 and 1899-1901, believing that this same data would
permit some analysis of changing arrest patterns over time.
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11%. In 1880, Indians comprised 49 arrests out of 210, or 23% of all jailings. At
the end of the century (partly representing a gap in the records), comparable data
indicates this higher proportion of Indians jailed has continued: for the year
October 1899 through September 1900, 37 Indians of a total of 176 persons, or
21%, were lodged in the jail. For the year of October 1900 through September
1901, 41 Indians were jailed of 203 persons, or 20%.251 These last figures show
Grand River Indians were jailed at a rate more than twice their proportion in the
population.
These jailings reflect the imposition of Canadian law on the Grand River
Iroquois, a people who in the early part of the nineteenth century were self-
governing and applied their own laws in accordance with a right guaranteed to
them by treaty.252 The imposition of Canadian law into Grand River Iroquois life
was a deliberate policy designed to subordinate these Indians to the Canadian
state, denying them any legal status other than as dependents of the government.
The use of these arrests to enforce Indian Department rules regarding the cutting
of timber and hay was resisted by the Iroquois and has already been
documented. 53
An examination of the pattern of Indian jailings reveals some details of the
economy and society of the Grand River Iroquois, and indicates the scope of the
imposition of Canadian law on Indians. Most Indians were jailed for
drunkenness, commonly after failing to pay small fines. Ellen Doxtader, a
"housekeeper" (meaning a housewife), was jailed for 20 days after failing to pay
a $5 fine for being "drunk and disorderly." Mary English, whose occupation was
listed as "prostitute," served the same sentence for failing to pay the same $5
fine after being charged with being "drunk and disorderly." She was not charged
with prostitution. John Whiskey and Joseph Hill, both labourers, served the same
sentence on the same charge for failing to pay the same $5 fine.2 54
Little changed over time: the number of arrests simply increased; the standard
sentence for "drunk and disorderly" increased from twenty to thirty days; and the
number of previous arrests, not surprisingly, continued to get larger. Julia Good,
a forty-nine year old housekeeper, spent the Christmases of 1899, 1900 and 1901
in Brantford jail. She served thirty days for assault in November of 1899, her
thirty-first jailing. In December she served fourteen days for vagrancy. By
251 I use a year beginning October I through September 30 to accommodate the fact that the
volume begins with October data.
252 The Six Nations Iroquois always held that their legal status was as "allies" and not "subjects"
of the Crown. M. Montgomery, "The Legal Status of the Six Nations Indians in Canada"
(1963) 55 Ontario History 93. See also E. Cork, The Worst of the Bargain (San Jacinto:
Foundation for Social Research, 1962).
253 Supra section lB.
254 Brantford Jail Register, vol. 1, July 1873.
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December of 1901, her record showed thirty-eight previous arrests. She was an
old woman jailed nine times in two years.255
James Hill, a farmer who was sentenced to thirty days or a $5 fine for
drunkenness, paid his fine. 256 The jail records show that only a few Indians ever
paid their fines, probably reflecting the absolute poverty of the Grand River
Iroquois. In a cash-poor society, even $5 fines meant a month in jail. Given the
nature of Iroquois society, extended families must have struggled to raise the
money to pay fines. Richard Marade, a twenty-seven year old labourer, was
sentenced to ninety days in jail for assault, or a fine of $18. The fine was paid
after he had served fourteen days in jail, apparently reflecting the amount of time
it took friends or relatives to raise the money.257
Besides the run of petty drinking and assault arrests, a large number of jailings
involved petty property crimes, theft, vandalism, or trespassing. It is difficult to
characterize the meaning of these jailings. They may suggest a considerable
effort on the part of the Indian Agent to use Canadian law to force Indians to
adopt white property values. Similarly, arrests under the Indian Act for resource
disposition offences, such as selling timber and hay without the Agent's
permission, fall in this category. The prison records do not record sufficient
information in most cases to ascertain the kinds of property interests involved.
Of particular interest is that petty property offences were the most likely to
result in acquittals, a rare event in drunk and disorderly arrests. Aurelia Sero,
aged fourteen, was held for one day on a charge of "destroying property" and
then acquitted. James Hill, Peter Davis and Henry Hill, boys aged ten to thirteen,
were arrested for stealing property from a railroad, and held for two days before
being acquitted. Lucy Sero, a servant aged seventy, was arrested for "obtaining
goods under false pretenses," but was discharged. Meshak Green, a twenty-two
year old labourer, was discharged after serving two days on the same charge.
William King, jailed for "horse-stealing," was discharged after four days. Emily
Carver was arrested twice, once for "theft" and once for "destroying property,"
only to have both charges dropped. 258 Well over half of all persons jailed for
property crimes were discharged without being convicted, usually after one to
four days in jail, suggesting that the Crown could not secure convictions in those
cases. This must mean that, unlike in drunk and disorderly cases where a police
officer was the complaining witness, the prosecution was unable to get the
testimony of complaining witnesses in property crime cases. It may be that the
255 Ibid. vol. 3, November 1899 through December 1901.
256 Ibid. vol. 3, January 1900.
257 Ibid. vol. 3, July 1900. I have no direct evidence on the reasons why Indians did not pay their
fines. It is possible that there were other reasons besides poverty; for example, there could be
cultural reasons why families simply did not go to the jail to bail out their brothers and sisters,
mothers and fathers. Similarly, refusal to pay bail could have been an act of political defiance, a
statement of the illegitimacy of white authority.
258 Ibid. vol. 3, July 1900 to January 1901.
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property crimes charged did not victimize individuals, either Indian or white,
because these individuals would have had the motivation to prosecute the cases,
especially once they had taken the trouble to bring the initial complaint. Rather,
it suggests that these property offences were brought by the Crown with the
Crown as a victim, probably upon the action of the Indian agent, acting on
various sorts of information that was not legal evidence. The fact that most of
the charges were dropped in a few days was of no concern: the majesty and
power of the government was established merely by arresting the Indians and
locking them in jail for a few days.
Felony charges against Indians were rare. Of these, about half were for the
crime of horse-stealing. This was probably the most common nineteenth century
rural crime given that horses were the most valuable property that could be
removed easily from a farm. Peter English, an eighteen year old farmer, drew a
three year sentence for horse-stealing. In one incident, four Indian men were
convicted of horse-stealing. John Everett and Peter Green, both illiterate twenty-
one year old labourers, drew four year sentences. George Green, twenty years
old, received a one year sentence and Peter English, seventeen, a six month
sentence. 259 The fact that jail records listed all four young men as "unable to
read" at a time when most Indians (and virtually all younger Indians) were listed
as literate, indicates that even the most basic formal education was not reaching
all segments of the Grand River population. Because distances were not great, it
is likely that those Indians who avoided white schools did so for personal
reasons, making the traditional choice to avoid Canadian institutions.
Serious crimes of violence were more rare. Ed Wilson, a twenty-two year old
carpenter, received a five year sentence for rape: the only rape conviction
reported in the five years sampled. 260 Several other rape charges were dismissed.
There appear to have been three homicides involving Grand River Indians
between 1873 and 1901. In one case, Ben Carrier, a twenty-eight year old
labourer, was convicted of killing his wife and was hanged. 261 John Yellow,
convicted of manslaughter for a drunken killing, received a ten year sentence. 262
Saddest of all was the case of Margaret Wabaneeb. She killed her daughter,
Margaret Fox, by hitting her on the head with an axe while visiting her in the
Brantford Jail. Fox had been convicted of vagrancy and was serving a thirty day
sentence. Wabaneeb was released on bail and ultimately acquitted of
259 Ibid. vol. 3, October 1899.
260 Ibid. vol. 3, October 1901.
261 Ibid. vol. 1, April 1880. The case file is held in the Ontario Provincial Archives, RG 22, 392-0-
278, Box 7 "Brant County." This box contains ten Indian felony case files from the 1880s.
262 Ibid. vol. 1, September 1880. The case file is held in the Ontario Provincial Archives, RG 22,
392-0-278. Box 7.
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manslaughter charges, probably reflecting the hopelessness of convicting an
eighty-five year old woman of such a crime.263
Most of these convictions were the result of summary trials before police
magistrates. The Indian Agent at Grand River Reserve was also legally
empowered to act as a police magistrate and we know from several appellate
cases that he aggressively did so. 264 Unfortunately, jail data does not show
whether the convictions of individual Indians involved police magistrates in
Brantford or other localities off the reservation, or involved the Indian agent.
Obviously, this distinction is a significant one, for the intrusion of Canadian law
into the life of reserve Indians is a distinct issue from the question of holding
off-reserve Indians legally accountable for illegal activities.
If we extrapolate from the 1873-1880 and 1899-1901 data to estimate the
arrests in the missing volume of the Brantford Jail records (and assume that the
pattern between volumes one and three is stable) it appears that about 1,000
Grand River Indians were jailed from 1873 to 1901 inclusive. This is a
staggering proportion of a population of 3,000. While some of the jailings
involved recidivists, most offenders are listed as never having been previously
jailed. Julia Good was arrested thirty-nine times, the highest number of arrests
recorded. Joseph John was arrested twenty-four times. Between 1899 and 1901,
no other Indians had more than five arrests. Further, eight of ten Indians jailed
had never been jailed before. This data suggests that jailings were widespread in
the Indian population at Grand River, and involved a substantial proportion of
the adult male population. Even though Julia Good was jailed the most times,
few of those jailed were women.
This evidence also suggests that the stereotype of Indians being arrested
repeatedly for drunkenness does not describe the situation at Grand River and
Brantford. The fact that two Indians appear to fit that pattern shows that local
authorities were willing to arrest Indians repeatedly for drunkenness. This
willingness appears to show that no other Indians fit that pattern-otherwise
they would have been repeatedly arrested as well. Most arrests were for drunk
and disorderly behaviour, and they generally involved only one incident.
However, the widespread distribution of jailings resulted in the coercive impact
of Canadian criminal law and was employed against a much larger proportion of
Grand River Indians. The social and cultural meaning of being jailed in
nineteenth century Ontario must have been far different for Indians than for
whites. Jail, as a social institution, was completely foreign to tribal society:
placing human beings, free in nature, in small cages must have seemed bizarre
and cruel to Native people.265 Western society routinely accepts jail, even for
263 Ibid. vol. 1, August 1880. The case file is held in Ontario Provincial Archives, RG 22, 392-0-
278.
264 Hunter v. Gilkison, supra note 80.
265 This issue is the subject of a Royal Commission on Aboriginal Deaths in Custody in Australia.
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small offences involving non-violent people. At least one Grand River Indian in
four went to Brantford Jail between 1873 and 1900, an experience that must
have had a serious impact on the social and cultural life of Native people there.
Through this process, Canadian law was imposed on the Grand River Iroquois.
The open use of tribal law to resolve disputes and to maintain social control was
impaired. This was a deliberate, colonial interference with Iroquois life and
culture.
IV. CANADIAN LAW AND THE LEGAL CULTURE OF
NINETEENTH CENTURY ONTARIO INDIANS
Nineteenth century Ontario Indians were legal actors, actively using both their
traditional law and Canadian law to structure the rapid social change
transforming Native society. While as many as one-fourth of the Grand River
Indians were jailed at some point in their lives for petty offences under Canadian
law, the same Indians also used Canadian law to frame a claim against the
Dominion government for the loss of some of their lands in 1832 to the Grand
River Canal Company. This was one of the first successful claims won by a tribe
against the Canadian state.2 66 The Grand Council of the League of the Iroquois
regularly included in its meetings the adjudication of disputes. This tribal
government of the Grand River Reserve handed down judgments that were
legally binding on the reserve under tribal, not Canadian law.267 While the Grand
River Iroquois were highly organized, none of these processes were unique to
Grand River: Indians throughout Ontario were legally active, constructing their
own legal relationships with each other, local whites and Ontario and Dominion
institutions. A legal history of this Native activity is just beginning to exist in
formal scholarship, but has always existed in Native tradition.
This enquiry must begin with the survival and transformation of Native law
and legal institutions in nineteenth century Ontario. The Grand River Iroquois'
legal history is the most carefully preserved, with dozens of recorded case
dispositions. These reported cases, dealing primarily with constitutional law,
land law, Indian citizenship and inheritance, reveal a fully functioning Grand
specifically aboriginal culture in Australia. Royal Commission on Aboriginal Deaths in
Custody, National Report (Canberra: Australian Government Publishing Service, 1991).
266 R.C. Daniel, A History of Native Claims Processes in Canada, 1867-1979 (Ottawa: Department
of Indian and Northern Affairs, 1980) at 122-30.
267 Law and Government of the Grand River Iroquois, supra note 247. An appendix titled "A Case
Book of Iroquois Law" begins at 115, and reports more than a hundred cases. Noon based these
reports on official records of the Grand Council, containing only the disposition of cases
brought before the Council. Noon then obtained the facts of each case by interviewing two
chiefs in the 1930s who had sat on the council, providing a factual statement of the issues in
cases extending back to the 1870s.
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River legal system. While matters of criminal law were not decided, the Council
of Chiefs exercised its powers in areas of misconduct. The Council used the
tribe's "forest bailiff' to eject individuals from lands occupied without legal
rights, to investigate the unlawful taking of wood from neighbours' lands and to
eject a young man guilty of adultery from his father's house.2 68 These cases
indicate that the Grand River Iroquois exercised tribal jurisdiction over many of
the same issues that the Crown tried in its District Courts.
Clearly, there was direct competition between the courts evidenced by an
action brought by Jonas Baptiste in the Grand Council for improvements to lands
to which he had lost title by failing to make payments. When the Grand Council
ruled against Baptiste, he threatened to bring the suit in Ontario District Court.
He was expressly forbidden to do so by the Council, but defiantly brought the
lawsuit anyway. Baptiste was non-suited for jurisdictional reasons that are not
clear, and he was ordered to pay the costs. Later, Baptiste applied to the tribe for
assistance in paying his court costs, but the Grand Council refused, deciding that
he could go to jail for failing to pay. 269 The tribe's action in forbidding access to
Ontario courts was doubtlessly an attempt to protect its own jurisdiction in intra-
tribal matters.
This act was also in defiance of an 1890 Order in Council in which the
Dominion government stated that Canadian courts were "open to enforce their
[Six Nations] contracts, or to afford redress for injuries to their persons or
property, not only as between them and the white people, but in relation to each
other."270 The Six Nations, however, did not accept this view of their legal rights.
Their legal dispute with the Dominion, still unresolved, intensified in the early
twentieth century as the tribe protected its legal jurisdiction against the increased
attempts of both Dominion and Ontario officials to exercise jurisdiction over
Grand River Indians. In Council v. Estate of Jasper Jones, Sophie General and
Department of Indian Affairs, the Council held that it, and not the Department of
Indian Affairs, had jurisdiction over inheritances on the Grand River Reserve. 271
268 Ibid.: Jonas Baptiste v. Council at 117; Job Green v. Gus Green at 118; In Re Peter Williams at
118; Josiah Stoats v. Simon Staats at 119. The Council did not concede that it lacked criminal
jurisdiction, rather it simply did not actively assert it. On the contrary, in Council v. Estate of
Jasper Jones, Sophie General and Department of Indian Affairs at 149, the Council held: "[Ilt
is a tradition repeatedly confirmed by testimony of the chiefs that the Confederacy delegated to
the Crown, and later to the Dominion government, full jurisdiction over only three matters.
These are: rape, treason and murder."
269 Jonas Baptiste v. Council, ibid. at 118. Noon reports the legal issue in this case as: "Can a Six
Nations Indian enter suit in the courts of the province of Ontario?" This statement was clearly
not accurate in late nineteenth century Ontario law; however, it reflects the issue as the chiefs,
who were Noon's informants, saw it. Thus, while Ontario law clearly recognized the right of
Indians to bring suit in Ontario courts, the Iroquois apparently did not know that this was the
case.
270 Order in Council, P.C. 2102 (12 November 1890).
271 Estate of Jasper Jones, supra note 268 at 146 (1917).
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Shortly thereafter, in Sero v. Gault, a Mohawk woman sued to recover her net,
which had been seized by Thomas Gault, an Ontario fishery inspector. She
argued that no Ontario warden had any authority on an Indian reserve. 272
Although this was not a Grand River case, the Six Nations mobilized behind the
treaty-based defence. After losing in Ontario courts, the Indians took the case to
the League of Nations.27 3
The cases reflect a clear sense of an evolving Iroquois law. William Jamieson
sued the Council for damages when stray dogs killed some of his sheep.274 The
Grand Council refused to pay, citing the lack of a tribal statute. They sought a
final decision from the Firekeepers, traditional Onondaga chiefs charged with
guarding the wampum belts, 275 who decided that the tribe should not pay
damages in such cases. This decision differed from local law on similar matters.
While the Township of Onondaga, adjacent to and including part of the
reservation, had a local by-law forbidding dogs to run at large, such a by-law did
not reach the Grand River Reserve because Indians and Indian lands were under
Dominion, not provincial law.276
While the legal culture of the Six Nations was unique, legal matters were not
the monopoly of Six Nations Indians alone. The Grand General Council of
Ontario Indians met regularly in the late nineteenth century, frequently
addressing legal issues. For example, their 1883 meeting at Hagersville involved
109 delegates from 21 reserves. 277 They specifically addressed three legal issues
in their minutes. First, they objected to a section of the Indian Act that denied
Indians the payment of government interest monies while in custody for criminal
offences. The delegates believed this denial was a "great injustice" since Indians
were "doubly punished for crime": they paid the same penalty as a white, and
the Indian Department denied their interest money. 278
A discussion of enfranchisement followed with most delegates favouring the
272 (1921), 50 O.R. 27.
273 A general history of this lawsuit is found in "The Legal Status of the Six Nations Indians in
Canada", supra note 252. The Canadian National Archives contains extensive files on this case,
including detailed arguments for and against Iroquois sovereignty. Attorney A.G. Chisholm,
hired by the Six Nations, filed a 180 page brief with the court arguing that Ontario lacked
jurisdiction. This legal issue is still unresolved. See D. Johnston, "The Quest of the Six Nations
Confederacy for Self-Determination" (1986) 44 U.T. Fac. L. Rev. 1; and M. Jacobsen, "Who
Rules the Valley of the Six Nations? (A Discussion of Isaac v. Davey)" (1976) 22 McGill L.J.
130; The Valley of the Six Nations, supra note 164, reprints several hundred primary documents
on the legal status of the Grand River Reserve.
274 William Jamieson v. Council in Law and Government of the Grand River Iroquois, supra note
247 at 118.
275 Ibid. The classic description of traditional Iroquois political organization is L.H. Morgan,
League of the Ho-di-no-sau-nee or Iroquois (New York: Dodd, Mead, 1901).
276 Re John Milloy and the Municipal Council of the Township of Onondaga (1884), 6 O.R. 573.
277 Minutes of the Grand General Council, New Credit Indian Reserve (Hagersville, Ontario,
1883).
278 Ibid. at 17-18. The discussion refers to s. 82 of the Indian Act.
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full political rights of Indians. A minority were opposed, believing that full
enfranchisement would be used to break up the reserves. 279 Delegates also
believed that Indians should be able to make a will bequeathing property without
the interference of the Indian Agent who, under the Indian Act, had to approve
such inheritances. 280 This meeting shows that Indians were political actors,
striving to reform the Indian Act to increase the rights of individual Indians.
Whole bands met in council, voted to request enfranchisement, and petitioned
the Ontario government to that effect. 28' The Cape Croker Band petitioned for
enfranchisement, but went far beyond, asking that the control of tribal money be
transferred from a corrupt Indian Agent to their chief. They further demanded
removal of the Agent for illegality and incompetence, citing eleven reasons. 282
Like the Dominion and Ontario governments, the tribes could cite the law to
protect their interests. Unlike the Dominion and Ontario governments, they
lacked the power to put the law in motion.
A large gathering of Indian leaders probably produced the clearest articulation
of Ontario Indian legal culture. This gathering was nothing more than
representatives of dozens of reserves, large and small, spread from the highly
developed corners of Eastern Ontario to its wilderness Northwestern boundary.
Local level legal and political articulation of Indian positions are not commonly
represented in Canadian legal history. A number of studies clarify that Indians
resisted the paternalism of the Indian Department. For example, Chief Michel
Dokis negotiated a reserve for his small Ojibwa band on the French River in the
Robinson Treaty of 1850.283 This reserve included sixty-one square miles of the
finest timber in Ontario. A critical element of the fiction of Canada's "liberal"
treatment of Indians is that the Indian's right to the land (whatever it was) was
freely purchased and obtained by consent. Any alienation of the Dokis' lands
also required consent. This was not a problem until the 1880s, when logging
companies approached Chief Dokis and the Indian Department to lease timber
rights to the reserve. Even after being told that all other reserves in the area had
sold their timber, the tribe refused to do the same. Under the Indian Act, a tribe
had to consent to the sale of its timber. Briefly, the Indian Department
considered changing the law so that timber reserves of "unreasonable" Indians
could be sold without their consent, but decided not to take such action as it
would expose the fiction of Indian consent, and possibly bring about a popular
279 Ibid.
280 Ibid. at 15-16.
281 Petition, Munsey Band of Indians to Attorney General of Ontario, Ontario Provincial Archives,
RG 4, file 1598 (1906).
282 P.S. Schmalz, The Ojibwa of Southern Ontario (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1991) at
217-18.




reaction.84 The Department tried to bribe the tribe to surrender its timber by
arranging a surrender vote and promising high payments. Chief Dokis was a
strong leader of a small band and he prevailed-the tribe voted against
surrender. 85 The tribe held out until 1908, when they voted eleven to six to
surrender the timber. Their timber was ultimately "voluntarily" surrendered, just
as their lands had been fifty-eight years before. The election was not a fair one:
the Department called it without sufficient notice to Chief Dokis to organize his
resistance, and arranged a large quantity of liquor for a feast the day before the
election. Despite having lost the timber, the tribe benefited from the chief's
resistance: instead of the few thousand dollars first offered in 1881, the timber
sold for $1.1 million: $600 per person per year instead of the $4 originally
offered. The Dokis Indians became the richest tribe, per capita, in Canada. 28 6
At a local level, the evidence suggests that Indians worked both inside and
outside the law in a number of ways to protect their autonomy against white
intervention, either in the form of the Indian Agent or local officials. The variety
and types of these actions suggest that Indians developed an effective grasp of
both Ontario and Indian law. At the level of basic sustenance, Indians continued
to hunt, fish and collect wood and hay in spite of Ontario or Canadian laws to
the contrary. It must have been clear to tribes and individual Indians that these
were their rights, and white attempts to interfere with their exercise was simply
wrong. The policing of such activity was virtually impossible. The arrests that
were made likely reflect only a small proportion of the total activity.
The complaint of H.P. Blackwood, president of the Minaki Campers
Association, reflects the frustration of whites who could not stop the Indians
from carrying on their lives as they wished despite the intrusion of whites on
their lands. Winnipeg citizens had built many elaborate summer homes on Lake
Minaki, but Indians, often under the influence of alcohol, camped on beaches
near these summer homes and engaged in "dreadful behaviour." Thefts were
occurring and, according to Blackwood, "ladies [were] complaining that it [was]
not safe to stay at the lake." 287 The Indian Department sent a special agent to
investigate Blackwood's charges. The agent identified a saloon-keeper as the
source of the liquor. The Department, however, was not able to stop the liquor
trade, or restrict the activities of the Indians.288
Local officials refused to arrest Indians because such arrests were pointless.
The Secretary of the Department of Indian Affairs complained to the Attorney
General of Ontario about the lock-up at Fort Francis in Northwest Ontario. Six
or seven Indians escaped from Fort Francis but the local authorities, knowing
284 Ibid. at 186-87.
285 Ibid. at 190.
286 Ibid. at 196.
287 Letter of H.P. Blackwood to Superintendent, Indian Department. RG 4, series 4-32 (1913).
288 Ibid. Report of W.E. Bennett, Indian Department Special Agent, to Superintendent.
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where the escapees were, did not bother to re-arrest them.289 Because Indians had
served one to two days in jail before the escape, local officials probably thought
that whatever justice was served by sentencing them to jail had already been
served. The situation at Kenora was arguably even worse: their jail was so full
that Indians tried and sentenced for liquor offences had to be released with a
suspended sentence. Again the Indian Department intervened, requesting the
Ontario Attorney General ensure sufficient jail "accommodation" was available
to "receive Indian prisoners."290
The same issue arose at Little Current, where local authorities refused to allow
the Indian constable to admit Indian prisoners into the jail. The Mantowaning
Reserve had no jail of its own, which necessitated either taking prisoners to the
next jail twenty-three miles away, or releasing them. 291 Local authorities claimed
the village lacked funds required for a full time jail-keeper, but the local Indian
Agent claimed this excuse was false.292 Rather, it seemed that the town simply
did not want the trouble of a jail filled with intoxicated Indians. All of these
cases suggest some of the limits of Ontario criminal law in locking up Indian
defendants. The Indian Department must have been concerned with how Ontario
law appeared to the Indians under such circumstances.
William Young, police magistrate at Rat Portage, went with a constable to
investigate complaints of trouble with Indians and theft at lumber camps in the
Lake of the Woods area.293 Young complained that "rather a dishonest set of
Indians lived in this locality" who stole many provisions from the lumber
companies. The Indians simply "took to the woods" when Young arrived and
were safe from arrest. The magistrate, a model of Ontario legality, left an arrest
warrant with the foreman of one of the lumber camps. He was quite proud of his
initiative, writing that an arrest "will be easily done as they will have no
suspicion of his being authorized to arrest anyone." Young went on to write that
"the Indians must be made to understand that acts of this kind will bring
punishment on them." 294 No further record of this case remains; hence, it is
unknown whether the arrest warrant was executed. In any case, this report
provides insight into the quality of criminal justice being rendered to Indians in
Western Ontario. A logging company employee was empowered to arrest
Indians who were allegedly stealing company property. The capacity of Indians
289 Letter of Superintendent of Indian Affairs to Attorney General, Ontario Provincial Archives,
RG 4, Series 4-32, file 1324 (24 September 1904).
290 Letter of Mr. Pedley, Deputy Superintendent of Indian Affairs to J.J. Foy, Attorney General of
Ontario, Ontario Provincial Archives, RG 4, file 608 (2 May 1906).
291 Letter of Tom McLean, Secretary, Department of Indian Affairs, to Ontario Attorney General,
Ontario Provincial Archives, RG 4, file 865 (18 May 1907).
292 Ibid. Letter of Mr. Sims, Indian Agent, to Secretary, Department of Indian Affairs (7 May
1908).




to "take to the woods" was not without boundaries as the changing economy
required increasing contact with whites. 95
Complaints reporting theft by Indians were frequent, but it is impossible to
ascertain the extent of such activity. Theft is clearly a survival mechanism of
starving people. It also has social and political meanings, especially where
Indian land and livelihood had been stolen from them-or had been taken away
according to legal processes unparalleled in Native society.296
The picture of Native life in Ontario at the turn of the century is a dismal one.
Gradually, Indians retreated to their reserves, increasingly becoming less visible.
Racism ran rampant in rural villages. Reverend J. Cadot, a Roman Catholic
missionary, complained of conditions at Wiarton and reported that Indians
resented the affront of discrimination in the inns and barbershops in the village.
Indians were forced to eat at separate tables in remote sections of inns, not
properly cleaned or waited on.297 This discrimination occasionally reached
embarrassing proportions. When Peter Whiteduck and Jocko escaped from
Pembrook jail and killed a jailer in the process, their village was occupied by a
large force of vigilantes. Men were not permitted to leave their homes to report
to work, houses were illegally searched and the occupants were abused. Even the
Attorney General of Ontario complained that local authorities had abused their
authority, reporting that no white community could ever be treated that way.298
Jocko was shot dead by a civilian posse under questionable circumstances and
Whiteduck was returned to jail. While in jail he wrote several sad letters on toilet
paper, asking his friends to help him escape to the woods. The letters, seized by
his jailor, were used in court as evidence of his dangerousness when, in fact,
they testify more to Whiteduck's despair, isolation and loneliness.299
While the imposition of Canadian law on the Indian tribes involved legal
violence in individual cases, Canadian Indian policy generally reflected pride in
the "liberal treatment of Indians," a legal policy that promoted the immigration
of Europeans such that "their contact in the interior might not become
295 Recall the case of Pierre Hunter, who froze to death after his jailing for shooting and selling
moose. He escaped punishment for a year by retiring to his remote village, but ultimately
returned to Sioux Narrows to earn a livelihood. See supra section IF.
296 See e.g., E.D. Genovese, Roll, Jordan, Roll: The World the Slaves Made (New York: Pantheon,
1974) especially "Roast Pig Is a Wonderful Delicacy, Especially When Stolen" at 599-613. On
Ojibwa conceptions of property earlier in the nineteenth century, see H. Hickerson, "Land
Tenure of the Rainy Lake Chippewa at the Beginning of the 19th Century" (1967) 2
Smithsonian Contributions to Anthropology 41.
297 Letter of J. Cadot to Attorney General of Ontario, Ontario Provincial Archives, RG 4, file 109
(9 January 1908). Wiarton is near the Cape Croker Reserve on the Bruce Peninsula. For a
history of Ojibwa life, see The Ojibwa of Southern Ontario, supra note 282, c. 8: "Reserve
Stagnation" at 180-226.
298 Letter of Attorney General to Superintendent, Ontario Provincial Police, RG 4 (1916).
299 Case file, Rex v. Peter Whiteduck, RG 22, series 392, Box 134 (1916).
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collision."300 The low incidence of violent confrontation of the frontier in Canada
compared to the hundred or more Indian wars of the United States, invites
comparative analysis. There is scant evidence of either Native resistance to
Canadian authority or of the legal structuring of frontier violence. Most Native
resistance took forms other than violent resistance to Canadian authority.30
However, Ontario had at least one important incident in which Indians violently
resisted Canadian authority-the "Manitoulin Incident of 1863." Indians
objected to a white fishery operating on unceded tribal lands. The Indian
Department requested a fishery inspector, the only government official in the
area, to warn the Indians to leave the fishery alone. The inspector, William
Gibbard, left the village after a shouting match. The Indians were determined to
drive the whites from their land. Twenty-five Indians landed at the fishery and
threatened whites at knife-point. Reinforcements from a nearby ship drove the
Indians off, but fifty Indians returned the next day and forced the whites away
from the fishery.302 The Indian Department dealt with this violation of Canadian
law using a legal model: Gibbard recruited thirteen armed police officers from
Toronto and Barrie and returned to Manitoulin Island to arrest the offenders. The
Indians resisted: some Indians verbally harassed the police, while others returned
with guns. A shouting and pushing match ensued. The police withdrew after an
Indian agreed to submit to arrest when the police boat returned from patrol. A
second Indian was also arrested, but no disposition of either case is reported. 303
While the event reflects some success of the model using the law to structure
Indian/white relations, it also reveals the limitations of that model.
The Bear Island case brought to public attention-and to Ontario law-the
legal history of the Temagami Ojibwa. Their story is an amazing one, not
because it is unique, but because it illustrates the complex legal and political
histories of every Indian band. Nebenegwune, headman of the band, was not
present at the signing of the Robinson Treaty at Manitoulin. During the late
nineteenth century, the band zealously guarded their independence, trading in
furs for a livelihood in complete ignorance of Ontario law. The killing of Chief
300 This description of Canadian Indian policy was written by Chancellor Alexander Boyd in St.
Catharine's Milling, supra note 181 at 215.
301 The focus on overt warfare as a form of Native resistance to the imposition of colonial
authority denies the resistance of Native people who chose other forms of resistance, a prudent
choice given the genocide that routinely followed colonial wars. For an analysis of the various
forms of Native resistance to colonial authority in a comparative context see R. Guha,
Elementary Aspects of Peasant Insurgency in Colonial India (Delhi: Oxford University Press,
1983); and J.C. Scott, Domination and the Arts of Resistance: Hidden Transcripts (New
Haven: Yale University Press, 1990).
302 D. Leighton, "The Manitoulin Incident of 1863: An Indian-White Confrontation in the
Province of Canada" (1977) 69 Ontario History 113.
303 Ibid. at 121-24.
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Cana Chintz by his brother Syagquasay led to a maze of jurisdictional confusion
between Quebec and Ontario. The tribe finally punished the crime under its own
law.304 The band tried hard to negotiate a favourable accommodation between
itself and the government on its own terms. This agreement was necessitated by
the legal confusion of St. Catharine's Milling: any wilderness land the Dominion
would provide as a reserve belonged to Ontario, thus requiring Ontario to agree
to any settlement. Ontario and Dominion negotiators were not able to agree on
the Temagami claims. In 1929, Ontario demanded the Indians pay rent on the
land on which their Bear Island homes were built.305 This whole story is still in
litigation. Judge Steele did not accept much of the oral history presented in
support of the band's claim, holding, for example, that the Temagami were
represented by Tawgaiwene, a neighbouring chief, at the Robinson-Huron treaty
negotiations.36 Ontario, conceding some Native settlement rights to a few
hundred acres, still refuses to recognize anything more than the band's very
limited usufructuary right to its land. The band, in turn, has an unbroken history
of asserting its rights to both land and sovereignty against both Ontario and the
Dominion. The evidence of Temagami legal tradition-legal precedent in tribal
law-was approached by the Ontario court through the formalistic framework of
Canadian law. The question of Nebegwune's legal status as headman in 1850
should have turned entirely on Temagami law, as should the question of any
Temagami relationship with Tawgaiwene. Instead, the result turned on the law
of evidence. Judge Steele applied a "balance of probabilities" test to his own
culture-bound and subjective reading of Temagami history.307
V. CANADIAN LEGAL CULTURE AND NATIVE RIGHTS
Canadian judges have not adequately addressed the issue of Native rights,
deferring "legal" issues concerning Native people to legislative power. This is
true even though the Anglo-Canadian legal tradition provides an adequate
framework for addressing the issues. Despite Canadian awareness of United
304 B.W. Hodgins, "The Temagami Indians and Canadian Federalism, 1867-1943" 11 Laurentian
University Review 71 at 72-73; and The Temagami Experience: Recreation, Resources and
Aboriginal Rights in the Northern Ontario Wilderness, supra note 5.
305 "The Temagami Indians and Canadian Federalism, 1867-1943", ibid. at 78-87.
306 Attorney-General for Ontario v. Bear Island Foundation et al. (1984), 49 O.R. (2d) 353 at 441-
47.
307 K. McNeil, "The Temagami Indian Land Claim: Loosening the Judicial Straight Jacket" in
Bray & Thomson, eds., supra note 5 at 189-93.
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States legal literature on the status of Indians under American law, which is
extensively cited throughout Ontario Indian cases and especially in St.
Catharine's Milling, Canadian judges still failed to address issues of native
rights. Virtually all commentators on nineteenth century Ontario (and Canadian)
law agree that it was dominated by "judicial conservatism," a judicial reluctance
to depart from narrow interpretations of existing precedent and to shape a
substantive law more responsive to the needs of a changing and expanding
nineteenth century society. 308
Legal formalism, the construction of elaborate opinions carefully following
precedent, is one manifestation of judicial conservatism. Risk, a careful observer
of late nineteenth century Ontario law, succinctly states the impact of this
formalism on the courts' decision-making process:
In Ontario the courts seemed to assume that the common law was
composed of rules firmly settled by authority, primarily English authority.
It was almost never expressly justified, beyond the justification implicit in
its mere existence and the internal authority of courts in a hierarchy.... The
process of making decisions usually seemed to be simply finding facts and
applying the rules. If the law was obscure or uncertain, the court simply
had to look harder to find it.309
Moreover, this judicial conservatism occurred in a context where the highest
appeal was to the Privy Council, which made British law, an unusually
formalistic body of law, the law of Canada. Obviously, the implications of such
conservatism in the law of Indian rights are clear: there was no legal precedent,
leaving the courts to follow narrowly legislative policy, itself poorly developed
until after the 1876 consolidation of the Indian Acts. 310
Judicial conservatism can be seen in the highly unsatisfactory state of the
Ontario case law on Indian matters prior to St. Catharine's Milling. These
decisions are models of ambiguity and vagueness, settling narrow questions
without ever expressly stating major legal conclusions about Indians' rights.
This explains the apparent anomaly of the large number of nineteenth century
308 J. Nedelsky, "Judicial Conservatism in an Age of Innovation: Comparative Perspectives on
Canadian Nuisance Law 1880-1930" 281; and R.C.B. Risk, "The Law and the Economy in
Mid-Nineteenth Century Ontario: A Perspective" 88, both in Flaherty, ed., supra note 14, vol.
1. See also J.F. Newman, "Reaction and Change: A Study of the Ontario Bar, 1880-1920"
(1974) 32 U.T. Fac. L. Rev. 51.
309 R.C.B. Risk, "'This Nuisance of Litigation': The Origins of Workers' Compensation in
Ontario" in Flaherty, ed., supra note 14, vol. 2, at 418 at 449.
310 All of Canada's Indian laws were consolidated in 1876-nine years after Confederation-into a
single "Indian Act." R.G. Moore, The Historical Development of the Indian Act, 2d ed.
(Ottawa: Treaties and Historical Research Centre, P.R.E. Group, Department of Indian and
Northern Affairs, 1978) at 60-70.
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Ontario cases involving Native rights, which left the law of Native rights poorly
defined and ambiguous. This tradition continues in Ontario law through Bear
Island.
Judicial conservatism, in itself, does not explain the course of Indian law in
Ontario, for this decision-making process was the product of a very narrow
circle of judges. The highest levels of nineteenth century legal policy-making in
Ontario were occupied by only a few people who exercised great, often
unchallenged influence, for long periods of time. For political and personal
reasons, none of these men had the slightest concern for questions of Native
rights.
John Beverley Robinson was Chief Justice of Ontario from 1829 to 1862,
capping a public legal career as Solicitor General and Attorney General of
Ontario.311 There is not a single piece of evidence to suggest that Robinson,
whose legal mind dominated Ontario jurisprudence in the first half of the
nineteenth century, was cognizant of any legal issues presented by the presence
of Ontario's 25,000 Indian people, a far more substantial portion of Ontario's
population early in the century than at the end. 3' 2 Robinson was a loyalist, the
son of a wealthy Virginia planter who had fought the revolutionary forces in the
United States. He moved to Kingston, Ontario to create a loyalist colony after
their loss in the Revolutionary War. Ontario was their creation: it was the
political and legal embodiment of colonial loyalism. There was more than legal
conservatism at the center of this jurisprudence: it was loyalty to the Crown, and
a strong legal defence of the Crown's prerogatives.313
Not surprisingly, the legal issue as Robinson saw it in Regina v. Baby was that
the "Indian lands" involved were simply "Crown lands," and therefore could not
be alienated without the consent of the Crown. 314 Robinson actually had to
express some view of Native people two years later in Totten v. Watson, a case
involving the white alienation of land granted to an Indian chief in fee simple.315
311 P. Brode, Sir John Beverley Robinson: Bone and Sinew of the Compact (Toronto: University of
Toronto Press, 1984); and T. Cook, "John Beverley Robinson and the Conservative Blueprint
for the Upper Canadian Community" (1972) 64 Ontario History 79.
312 This would have represented about ten percent of Ontario's 1840 population of about 250,000.
By 1900, Ontario, typical of the growth of the white population of all of North America, had a
population of 1,200,000, reducing the Indian proportion to about two percent. The term
"Indians" appears twice in Robinson's biography, both times referring to his service with
Indian allies in the Detroit area in the War of 1812. Sir John Beverley Robinson, ibid. at 14 and
16.
313 D. Howes, "Property, God and Nature in the Thought of Sir John Beverley Robinson" (1985)
30 McGill L.J. 365.
314 Regina v. Baby, supra note 43 at 353-54.
315 Totten v. Watson, supra note 55 at 395-96.
Vol. 56
"The Liberal Treatment of Indians"
His opinion turned on his view of Crown prerogatives; however, this time it was
cast in racial terms. In general, the legislature "might possibly have intended to
protect the Indians...for they are a helpless race, much exposed, from their want
of education and acquaintance with business, and the intemperate habits of many
of them... [emphasis added]"316 However, this policy conflicted with the action of
the Crown in granting this particular plot of land to "leading persons among the
Indians, who.. .had been treated by the [C]rown as officers in their service, and
who, it might be assumed, had sufficient intelligence to take care of their
property." 317 Thus, Robinson would not judicially recognize the policy behind
provincial legislation to protect Indian lands from alienation. Nevertheless, he
inferred a distinct status to the Indian land at issue because the Crown's land
grant must carry with it the Crown's judgment that the Indians in question were
distinct from the majority of the Indians in Ontario, and intelligent enough to
manage their own affairs.
William Hume Blake, Chancellor of Ontario from 1849 to 1862 and law
partner of Alexander Boyd, forms a key link between the early nineteenth
century Ontario of Robinson and the late nineteenth century Ontario of Oliver
Mowat. While Robinson was grounded in loyalist legal theory, believing Ontario
law was an extension of British law, even conservatives realized that the new
world had distinct social and economic needs that were not readily
accommodated in British law. Blake represented the interests of Ontario's mid-
nineteenth century economic elite who were interested in opening up the vast
wealth of the province.3'8 His contribution to Ontario law reform was in
restructuring the courts and the law to make the range of legal problems
developing from new economic forms more readily actionable, thereby
structuring more efficient legal resolution of disputes. This restructuring made
Ontario law more accessible to problems involving Indian rights, but did not
itself change the conservative tradition of deciding such cases. Blake himself,
perhaps the most competent jurist in nineteenth century Ontario, never decided a
reported Indian rights case. 319
Robinson's centering of legal thought on the rights of the Crown and Blake's
business-oriented legal reforms came together in the late nineteenth century legal
structuring of economic development in Ontario, as represented in the
Province's view of its rights in St. Catharine's Milling. While American frontier
development was characterized by a rapid transfer of the public domain into
unrestricted private ownership, a policy that put Indians in direct confrontation
316 Ibid. at 395.
317 Ibid. at 396. Robinson also referred to both Native rights and government policy in Bown v.
West, discussed supra at notes 59-61.
318 J.D. Blackwell, "William Hume Blake and the Judicature Acts of 1849: The Process of Legal
Reform at Mid-Century in Upper Canada" in Flaherty, ed., supra note 14.
319 Ibid. at 164.
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with all but uncontrollable white interests, Ontario resources policy involved
much more governmental control through Crown ownership, and timber and
mining leases.320 While out of control American miners first alienated Indian
lands in the Black Hills, it was the Ontario and Canadian governments that
"leased" Indian timber to whites.
This was the aggressive policy of Oliver Mowat, who served as Prime
Minister and Attorney General of Ontario from 1872 to the end of the century.
Mowat wanted Ontario governmental control of economic development, but in a
conservative, pro-business climate. Mowat, a former judge who had served in
the Ontario Court of Chancery in the 1860s, would never be regarded as a legal
scholar. 321 He was a pragmatist, desiring to use the institutions of government to
open up the wealth of Ontario.322 He was supported by business interests who
saw their own access to economic resources better served under Ontario control
than under Dominion control.323 Indians, in this model, were not only in the way,
but were also a financial liability best borne by Dominion resources. The legal
result of this model is exemplified in St. Catharine's Milling. Mowat was happy
to concede direct control over Indians and to cede small Indian reserves to the
Dominion government even though he viewed the land as "belonging" to
Ontario. In return, Ontario gained control of resources without any responsibility
to the traditional owners of the land.
Thus, a framework of judicial conservatism created a context in which no
juridicial concept of Indian rights could find any recognition in Indian cases.
Courts carefully framed every legal question to adhere rigidly to legal precedent.
This concept did not previously exist in British law, nor could it be easily
derived by analogy from related legal principles. Whenever an Indian came into
an Ontario court, the court took jurisdiction over her because it took jurisdiction
over all persons. The court then treated Indian cases as it would any other case
under Ontario law, with only a slight deference to the Dominion policy of
paternalism as embodied in statutory law.
By and large, this analysis has avoided direct comparisons to United States
Indian law, but Canadian legal history has a long tradition of comparison to the
United States. In many ways, this comparison is profitable because the two
320 H.V. Nelles, The Politics of Development: Forests, Mines and Hydro-Electric Power in
Ontario, 1849-1941 (Toronto: MacMillan of Canada, 1974) at 39. This history of the rapid
development of lands that were largely in the possession of Indians does not contain one
reference to "lndians"-they were totally irrelevant to the development of the Ontario
wilderness.
321 P. Romney, Mr. Attorney: The Attorney General for Ontario in Court, Cabinet and Legislature,
1791-1899 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1986) contains a detailed study of Mowat's
public policy initiatives as Attorney General of Ontario. Mowat's published opinions contain
no significant statement of his views on Native rights.
322 "Oliver Mowat: Nineteenth-Century Ontario Liberal" in Swainson, ed., supra note 171.
323 Flaherty, ed., supra note 14 at 181.
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countries share a similar common law and colonial heritage. Canadian courts
frequently cited American cases throughout the nineteenth century. Moreover,
the nineteenth century economic development of the two nations took parallel
forms. In particular, Ontario legal history has been interpreted in a comparative
context in reference to the legal history of Wisconsin, building on the work of
Willard Hurst.324 Hurst constructed a careful and elaborate legal history of the
use of law to structure the rapid economic development of a frontier state. He
found Wisconsin was roughly comparable to Ontario. Both had agricultural,
timber, and mining interests which dominated the state's economy; huge tracts
of wilderness; a single substantial metropolitan area; and roughly comparable
populations, reaching over a million before the end of the nineteenth century. 325
The Canadian legal historian R.C.B. Risk applied a Hurstian framework to
Ontario economic development, but made no reference to Indians. 326 This choice
does not reflect any kind of conscious desire to avoid dealing with the
significance of Indian rights in either Wisconsin or Ontario legal history. Rather,
it reflects only the few references to Indians in the major cases defining
economic development. Chief Justice Robinson's court filled fifteen volumes of
reporters. He wrote only two opinions concerning Indian rights. 327
While American and Canadian Indian policy might profitably be compared,
the focus here is on the judicial determination of Indian rights in the context of
those policies. Wisconsin judges, like Ontario judges, occasionally decided cases
involving Indian rights. There were markedly fewer such reported cases in
Wisconsin-ten before 1900, compared to fifty in Ontario. This difference
reflects two factors independent from the actual incidence of such cases. First,
Wisconsin had fewer Indians, about half that of the Ontario Indian population.
This was due both to the state's smaller size, and to a policy of Indian removal
that had led to the emigration of Winnebago, Sauk and Fox Indians.328 Second,
Wisconsin courts decided Indian cases in the context of a fully developed system
of federal courts. These federal courts decided not only several Wisconsin cases,
324 D.H. Flaherty, "Writing Canadian Legal History: An Introduction" in Flaherty, ed., supra note
14; J.W. Hurst, Law and Economic Growth: The Legal History of the Lumber Industry in
Wisconsin, 1836-1915 (Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1964); Law
and the Conditions of Freedom in the Nineteenth Century United States (Madison: University
of Wisconsin Press, 1956); and The Growth of American Law: The Law-Makers (Boston:
Little, Brown, 1959).
325 "Writing Canadian Legal History: An Introduction", ibid.
326 R.C.B. Risk, "The Nineteenth-Century Foundations of the Business Corporation in Ontario"
(1973) 23 U.T.L.J. 270; "The Golden Age: The Law About the Market in Nineteenth-Century
Ontario" (1976) 26 U.T.L.J. 307; "The Last Golden Age: Property and the Allocation of Losses
in Ontario in the Nineteenth Century" (1977) 27 U.T.L.J. 199; and "The Law and the Economy
in Mid-Nineteenth Century Ontario: A Perspective" (1977) 27 U.T.L.J. 403.
327 This is based on my own search through the indices of the Upper Canada Reporter.




but also decided cases from other states which clearly applied to all states, thus
legally binding Wisconsin courts and leading to routine applications of federal
law that would ordinarily not be reported. Beyond these differences, it can be
argued that Wisconsin courts decided Indian cases in ways remarkably similar to
Ontario courts, essentially rationalizing local white intrusions into tribal life and
state jurisdiction over Indians and Indian resources.
Wisconsin, in fact, was one of the most aggressive states in this respect, even
refusing to defer to the authority of federal law. In State v. Doxtater, a murder
case arising on an Indian reservation, the Wisconsin Supreme Court held that the
state had criminal jurisdiction over Indians on reservations as an attribute of state
sovereignty, even though federal law clearly rejected this view.329 Later, the
same court held that state school lands within Indian reservations were under
state jurisdiction, again inconsistent with federal law.330 The state also claimed
its fish and game laws applied to reservation Indians, locking up a Chippewa
Indian, John Blackbird, for "seining a few suckers."331 Similarly, the Wisconsin
Supreme Court permitted the application of state tort law to Chippewa Indians
on the Bad River Reservation to permit an Indian arrested under federal
authority to sue the federal officer for assault.332 Indeed, this case is indicative of
the entire history of state Indian law in the United States.
But there are limitations to any comparison between Canadian and American
Indian law. Nineteenth century Ontario courts not only lacked a body of
Dominion Indian law to which they could defer, but had it existed they would
not have deferred to it. Ontario lawyers and judges successfully took control of
Canadian Indian law in St. Catharine's Milling. What is most distinct about
nineteenth century Ontario Indian law is not that its judges were unique in
refusing to recognize Indian rights in any meaningful way. Rather, their
particularly conservative traditions of deciding cases left them no way to
conceptualize Indian rights independent of the narrow traditions of established
British and Canadian law. It appears, for example, that the courts lacked the
analytical tools to structure even existing Indian law into a coherent opinion in
the St. Catharine's Milling case. Therefore, the issue is more than one of judicial
conservatism. Legal formalism was used to deny the political choice inherent in
the courts' Native rights decisions.
At the same time, British law and legal tradition exercised a clear hold on
Ontario law that structured Indian law decisions very differently from the way
that federal Indian law structured state law in the United States. While United
States Indian law provided direct precedent that decided specific questions of
Indian rights for state courts, British law simply did not resolve parallel frontier
329 47 Wis. 278 (1879).
330 United States v. Thomas, 151 U.S. 577 (1893).
331 In Re Blackbird, 109 Fed. 139(1901).
332 Deragon v. Sero, 137 Wis. 276 (1898).
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disputes in Ontario. The British Crown, however, was a much more complete
sovereign than any existing state or federal authority under United States law.
Indeed, it is precisely the question of the relationship between the colony and the
Crown that most clearly distinguishes Canadian from American legal history. 333
Modes of judicial thought that easily permitted frontier judges in the United
States to write broad and sweeping opinions on questions of Indian rights reflect
a populism absent in nineteenth century Canadian law.
A comparison of the legal analysis of Native rights of the Canadian courts in
the context of the St. Catharine's Milling case with the legal analysis of the
American courts in the context of the "Cherokee cases" demonstrates the
different approaches to Native rights used in the two countries. The cases are
similar in that the parties involved recognized that major Indian rights issues
were at stake. In addition, the cases pitted the rights of the provinces (and states)
against the national governments in the context of new nations where formal
models of federalism were only beginning to develop. Some of the best legal
minds of both countries worked on the cases, as opinions were delivered by
dozens of judges of provincial, state and national courts.
The position that states had control of their lands as an attribute of state
sovereignty and had full jurisdiction over Indians flowing from that same
sovereignty was analyzed in State v. Caldwell, State v. Foreman and St.
Catharine's Milling.334 The legal analysis in the American cases is far better than
that found in the Ontario case. The best lawyers in Alabama and Tennessee
probably had less education and fewer library resources than Ontario's lawyers,
but crafted much better conservative legal arguments. Essentially, they referred
to a parallel body of primary historical materials: treaties, the history of British
and colonial dealings with the Indians and the Proclamation of 1763.
Similarly, St. Catharine's Milling fails as a statement of Indian legal rights
and cannot stand beside Cherokee Nation v. Georgia or Worcester v. Georgia. In
defence of the Supreme Court of Canada, one might argue that it did not have
the same issue before it; however, in fact it did. All parties understood that this
was an "Indian title" case, deciding the legal status of Indians in relationship to
their land. No clear statement of Native rights emerges from the case, nor is
there a significant discussion of the issues. This is true even though Judges
Strong and Gwynne dissented, raising reasonable and articulate legal arguments
defending some kind of Indian title. The majority simply did not engage the
substantive view that there was any question of Indian title: it was absolutely
clear from their understanding of precedent that this was impossible. Judge
Burton of the Ontario Court of Appeal thought that the idea of Indian title was
333 This is the thesis of D. Howes, "Property, God and Nature in the Thought of Sir John Beverley
Robinson", supra note 313.
334 State v. George Tassells, I Dud. 229 (1830); Caldwell v. State, 6 Peter 327 (1832); State v.
Foreman, 8 Yerg. 256 (1835).
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"startling" and to the best of his knowledge it was "the first time that such a
contention [had] been urged in a British Court of Justice."335 It is clear from this
ignorant statement that Judge Burton's reasons represent more than a careful
study of precedent.
VI. CONCLUSION
What does historical study of nineteenth century Ontario Indian law reveal
that is relevant to the current status of Native people in Ontario and in Canada?
There can be no question that it illustrates both the power of the law as a
political institution and the failure of law to come to terms with the legal rights
of Native people. The Ontario courts were critical in structuring Indian rights in
nineteenth century Ontario, notwithstanding the existence of the Indian Acts and
judicial deference to both statute and politics. While the courts deferred to the
Indian Acts, they did not mechanically follow them. For example, the judicial
view that Indians were complete persons in the eyes of Ontario law was
inconsistent with both the theory and practice of Indian Department policy and
the Indian Acts. The courts supported their view by subjecting many of the
elements of Indian Department paternalism to the strict formalistic requirements
of the law. For example, the courts required Indian Agents to act as police
magistrates and to follow the letter of the law, a process difficult for agents who
were untrained in law. Similarly, Indian alienation of timber and hay was of
great concern to the Indian Department, which invested many resources into
paternalistically controlling individual Indian economic activity. However,
Ontario courts were more balanced. They gave some effect to the Indian Act, as
required by their formalistic framework, but they also weakened the law, thereby
strengthening the power of individual Indians through a number of judicial
interpretations which permitted Indians to dispose of timber and hay without
permission.
Similarly, Ontario courts were consistent in according full legal rights to
Indians in every case where Indian legal status was at issue. This approach
implicitly weakened the paternalistic policy behind the Indian Act, a policy that
viewed Indians as unable to exercise the full responsibilities of citizenship and as
requiring the protection of the Indian Department. Statutory law governing most
of these rights was unclear. Therefore, the courts' consistency had a major
impact on defining the rights of nineteenth century Indians as individual citizens.
While the courts recognized the rights of Indians as individuals, the courts
simply did not come to terms with the political rights of the Indian people as
tribes, or with the broader concerns of Indian culture and social life.
335 Supra note 192 at 159.
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There is no way of determining whether this "liberal treatment of Indians"-
the extension of law to the frontier to govern the meeting of Indians and whites
there-accounts for the reduced violence occurring under Canadian domination
of the tribes. Clearly, there was starvation, a deprivation of lands and the
destruction of Native cultures and communities, but the fact remains that the
wholesale massacres that occurred by the hundreds in the United States did not
occur in Canada.
Finally, nothing in the Indian Acts statutorily dealt with Indian title or with
Indian property rights to the lands they had lived on since time immemorial.
While Indians were forbidden to sell land to anyone, nothing in the statutes
declared what property rights they held in their lands. This question was
implicitly left to Ontario courts. Arguably, it was the most important legal issue
affecting the rights of Canadian Indians. Contrary to some of the dicta in St.
Catharine's Milling, the Ontario courts simply did not decide the land title
question prior to this case. In fact, following formalistic legal traditions, it seems
clear that the courts decided every case involving ownership of Indian lands very
narrowly and thus avoided deciding the question of Indian property rights in
their lands. The Ontario courts decided the question directly in St. Catharine's
but only because it was directly put to them by the government of Ontario in a
context where they had no choice. Had the issue been raised by an Indian tribe,
Ontario courts would have avoided the issue, deciding the case on other grounds.
This broad contribution of the Ontario courts to Canadian legal tradition on
issues of Native rights, then, does not narrowly follow Indian Department policy
and the Indian Acts, but creates a common law of Native rights that is distinct
from statutory policy.
The issue of native rights presents constitutional problems. The "aboriginal
and treaty rights of the aboriginal people of Canada" are recognized in the
Canadian Constitution, but are not defined. 336 First it must be recognized that
these rights are legal rights, defensible in Canadian courts. Thus, when Chief
Justice Allan McEachern of the British Columbia Supreme Court denies that the
"difficulties facing the Indian populations of...[Canada], will not be solved in the
context of legal rights," he is directly denying that Native "difficulties" arise
from a lack of legal rights-rights to land, economic development and self-
government. He is wrong. 337 In referring to rights in such non-legal terms as
"difficulties," he not only demeans Native people's conceptions of their own
legal history, but demeans Canadian law, limiting the whole conception of
"rights" to the colonial settler population.338 As succeeding events have shown,
336 Home and Native Land: Aboriginal Rights and the Canadian Constitution, supra note I at I-
12. W. Pentney, "The Rights of the Aboriginal Peoples of Canada and the Constitution Act,
1982" (1988) 22 U.B.C.L. Rev. 21 at parts I & II.
337 Delgamuukw, supra note 2 at 299.




the failure of Canadian courts to honour the legal rights of Native people
undermines the whole Constitutional accord and renders the Constitutional
framework unworkable, placing Native people outside its structure.
There can be no question that the Gitksan and Temagami must be able to
defend their legal rights in Ontario and Canadian courts. It follows that Canadian
law must be reconstructed to respect those rights. This historical analysis of the
origins of Ontario Indian law shows not only that Canadian Indians lost many of
their legal rights in a legal process, but it also suggests that Indian rights are
legal rights, and that Canadian courts have the power to recognize these rights.
Canadian courts can exercise this power in several ways. Courts could begin
by reinterpretting St. Catharine's Milling, not in an attempt to re-write history,
but to recognize that its context gives it a narrow meaning, rather than the broad
effect that it is given in both Delgamuukw and Bear Island. In the least, it is fair
to say that no Native interests were legally defended in the case; hence, its
holding should be limited to secondary disputes between whites claiming title
through Indian title. New Indian land claims should be analyzed in modern
terms, interpreting Native rights in the context of both current recognition of the
equal status of the First Nations, and current legal theories of Native rights, a
body of jurisprudence that has given a great amount of attention to legal history
and current constitutional theory. A study of the legal history of Indian rights
cases is, of course, a study of precedent. St. Catharine's Milling simply cannot
stand for the proposition that Indian title never existed and fell to the Crown on
some version of conquest theory. Based on a reasonable interpretation of the
legal history of North America, such a proposition cannot be supported by the
case when broken down to its elements. Rather, some judges narrowly reached a
holding denying Indian property rights in the land for reasons deeply rooted in
politics, ignorance, Victorian racism and ethnocentrism. The Privy Council's
opinion, after hearing arguments that included many different theories of Indian
title, specifically held that it was unnecessary to chose between these theories as
long as whatever title the Indians had was less than the Crown's underlying title.
Any modem citation to St. Catharine's Milling must take that into account and
reinterpret directly the same sources that the respective courts misinterpreted.
Judge Steele's Bear Island opinion fails to accomplish these tasks. One can
easily imagine the Bear Island case being brought in the 1890s, in the immediate
wake of St. Catharine's Milling. Judge Steele's legal reasoning fits precisely into
that historical context and lacks not only humanity, but also honesty. His
judgment, based on legal formalism, does not reflect the current law of Native
rights, but rather nineteenth century Native rights.
Beyond Native rights is a related set of issues, also rooted in the history of
Native people. Nineteenth century Ontario legal history is a history of Anglo-
Canadian law, not of Native law. Native legal, social and political histories exist
in twentieth century Ontario, just as they existed in the nineteenth century. The
Vol. 56
"The Liberal Treatment of Indians"
legal history of the Grand River Iroquois spans both centuries: their legal dispute
with Canada over their right to their land has continued for over two hundred
years, and is evidenced by thousands of pages of documents and dozens of court
cases. The legal history of the Dokis band of Ojibwa is much less documented.
The legal histories of other bands are not documented at all in Ontario or
Canadian case law. These histories are documented in the minds of Native
people.
Both Bear Island and Delgamuukw make important contributions to Canadian
legal history in that they reveal the extent to which legal history lives in the
hearts and minds of Native people. Among the most important legal "facts" in
both cases are facts that have existed in the minds of Native people for a hundred
years: none of these Native peoples ceded any of their lands to Canada through
treaties. Careful descriptions documenting how these peoples interacted legally
with provincial and dominion authorities survived and were revealed in great
detail in court. The nature of the exercise of political and legal authority in both
bands a hundred years ago was carefully documented in court. There can be no
question that this Native legal history has a place as legal tradition in Canadian
law. This legal tradition is not only legal fact to be used by courts in deciding
cases, but is also legal precedent. Further, it is the only possible precedent for
Native people historically and substantially excluded from Canadian courts.
The Dominion of Canada somehow "lost" an Ojibwa reserve they had created
through negotiations with the Indians at Whitefish Lake in 1850. Thirty-nine
years later, the Dominion was involved in litigation with Ontario over whether
the reserve had in fact been created. Ironically, the Dominion called as its
witnesses Shewanaskishick and Mongowin, who remembered precisely where
the agreed upon boundaries of the reserve were.339 The memories of the two men
were perfect, setting out the exact boundaries that their fathers and the
government of Canada had carefully negotiated. Neither the statutory law nor the
common law of Canada embodied the legality of that reserve: Native legal
culture preserved that law for Canada and for the small band involved. Native
law and Native recollection of both the substance of Canadian law and of the
legal facts underlying Native rights cases must be given the effect of law
,because judicial formalism cannot give effect to either the substance or common
law of Native rights.
339 Attorney General of Ontario v. Francis et al., supra note 18 at 13-17.
1992

